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List of abbreviations 
European Commission: Commission 
European Banking Authority: EBA 
European Union: EU 
Gross domestic product: GDP 
Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union: TFEU 
Definition of a term 
Moral hazard:  
‘Moral hazard refers to someone’s willingness to take excessive risks just because they know 
someone else will come and save them from the possible negative consequences.’1 In the 
domain of economy this occurs when there is ‘asymmetric information, where one entity (the 
principal) does not know how another (the agent) will behave in the future’.2  
 
 
  
                                                          
1
 Titus Sucio, ´Financial Innovation and Moral Hazard´, (2011) 4 Bulletin of the Transilvania University of Brasov 177, 177  
2
 Christian Ahlborn and Daniel Piccinin, ‘The Great Recession and other mishaps: the Commission’s policy of restructuring aid 
in a time of crisis’ in Erika Szyszczak (ed) Research Handbook on European State Aid Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
2011) 135 
 
 
Summary 
The legal framework of EU State aid law  
In Article 107 (1) TFEU the concept of State aid under EU law is defined. Criteria for State 
aid are described in the Case law. Article 107 (2) and (3) TFEU define when aid is 
compatible with the internal market. Article 107 (3) TFEU provides for exemptions to the aid 
prohibited under Article 107 (1) TFEU. For State aid in the financial sector Article 107 (3) (b) 
and (c) TFEU are particularly important. 
The rules on State aid are applicable to the financial sector. The four types of aid measures 
are funding guarantees, liquidity measures, recapitalization and asset relief measures. The 
“private investor test” is used as a tool to determine whether a measure meets the criteria of 
State aid or not.  
The commission’s response to the financial crisis  
In response to the financial crisis the Commission approached the questions concerning 
national State aid to financial institutions, by developing a new legal framework with Article 
107 (3) (b) as its legal basis. There was a switch from using Article 107 (3) (c) to Article 107 
(3) (b) to approve State aid. 
The response to the financial crisis can be summarized as follows: 
1. Before October 2008, all Cases were dealt with under Article 107 (3) (c). 
2. Between October 2008 and late February 2009 Article 107 (3) (b) was used as a legal 
base.  
3. Since late February 2009 Article 107 (3) (b) was applied and there was a return to the 
application of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.  
4. Between July 2009 and December 2009 the Commission started to use the Financial 
Restructuring Guidelines.  
5. In July 2013 the 2008 Banking Communication was replaced by the 2013 Banking 
Communication. 
 
Prior to and in the early stages of the crisis the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines and 
Article 107 (3) (c) were used to approve State aid. The distortion of the aid under the Rescue 
and Restructuring Guidelines could only be justified by other social and economic benefits.  
The new legal framework consisted of the 2008 Banking Communication, the 
Recapitalization Communication, the Impaired Assets Communication, the Restructuring 
Communication and the 2013 Banking Communication. The 2008 Banking Communication 
 
 
and the 2013 Banking Communication have financial stability as its aim, while at the same 
time keeping distortions of competition to the minimum.  
Balancing between advantages and disadvantages of State aid in the  
financial sector 
There are economic and social advantages to State aid in the financial sector. The economic 
advantages of State aid in the financial sector are the preservation of the integrity of the 
internal market, ensuring financial stability, avoiding a total collapse of the financial system, 
decreasing the chance of a continuation and deepening of the financial crisis and protecting 
the national economy as a whole. During the financial crisis the Commission also used State 
aid measures with the aim of protecting a competitive market and to increase competition in 
the market. A social advantage is the protection of employment.  
Negative consequences of State aid in the financial sector are possible distortions of 
competition and moral hazard.  
In the Cases decided under the Crisis Framework, the social and economic benefits of the 
aid measures were increasingly seen in the protection of a competitive market and an 
increase in competition.  
The legal framework provides for a balancing between economic and social benefits and 
negative economic effects. In particular, there needs to be a balance between the restoration 
of financial stability on one hand and possible undue distortions of competition and 
fragmentation of the internal market on the other hand.    
The legal framework shows the need to limit distortions of competition. The Commission 
developed several manners and used basic legal principles such as proportionality and 
burden sharing to maintain or in certain circumstance increase competition in the banking 
sector through State aid. One important means of limiting distortions of competition is 
keeping the aid to the minimum amount necessary and that it must be of temporary nature.  
Throughout the legal framework the importance of burden sharing and a minimum own 
contribution are considered to be an important means of limiting distortions of competition. 
The principle of proportionality is used to assess the minimum burden sharing and the 
appropriate own contribution.  
In the beginning of the crisis the Commission distinguished between sound and unsound 
banks in its measures to limit distortions of competition. Less-performing banks needed less 
restructuring than well-performing banks. In the first prolongation of the Restructuring 
 
 
Communication, the distinction between fundamentally sound and unsound banks was taken 
away.  
The Cases show that in the beginning of the crisis when the decisions were taken under the 
Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines and under Article 107 (3) (b), the Commission referred 
to social objectives of the aid such as the need to protect employment. In contrast, in the 
Cases which were decided in a later phase under Article 107 (3) (c), the Commission 
focused more on the objectives of protection of financial stability and economic stability in the 
wider economy.  
In the Case law the Commission applied the means to prevent undue distortions of 
competition as developed in the legal framework. In all Cases the Commission took the 
relative amount of aid and its form into account when deciding about the appropriate 
measures to limit distortions of competition. This means that the principle of proportionality 
was applied in addressing the problem of distortions of competition.  
 
In highly concentrated markets, the creation of a new entity and divestments with the result 
of a reduction in market shares, were used as a means to increase competition and to avoid 
undue distortions of competition.  
 
Reductions in balance sheets and a ban on acquisitions during a certain amount of time, 
were frequently used measures to avoid distortions of competition. Furthermore, 
disincentives for aggressive commercial behavior such as the obligation to refrain from mass 
marketing were imposed on banks. The concern about moral hazard was addressed through 
a change in management of the banks.  
 
In the beginning of the crisis in 2008, a lesser degree of restructuring was required than at a 
later stage. With the introduction of the Restructuring Communication, the Commission 
became tougher with its structural measures and behavioral constraints. In the Case law, this 
resulted in an increasing degree of divestments and a stricter stance towards divestment 
periods.  
 
The most significant difference in the approach of restructuring banks for the purpose of 
limiting distortions of competition was the removal of the distinction between fundamentally 
sound and unsound banks. This can be seen in the Case law by the increasing degree of 
restructuring required for all banks.  
 
 
 
Overall, the legal framework and the Case law stressed the importance of limiting distortions 
of competition. There was a development towards stricter and tougher requirements for 
restructuring during the financial crisis, with the aim of limiting distortions.   
Balancing between short-term and long-term consequences of State aid  
In the legal framework the following long-term consequences of State aid can be identified: 
restoring long-term viability of the company; restoring financial stability; a return to normal 
market conditions; limitations of undue distortions of competition; avoiding fragmentation of 
the internal market and avoiding moral hazard.   
 
In the legal framework the following short-term objectives of State aid can be identified: 
restoring trust in the financial sector and thereby decreasing the likelihood of a total collapse 
of the financial system and avoiding moral hazard.  
 
At the beginning of the crisis there was slightly more focus on the short-term consequences 
of the aid, whereas by the end and after the crisis, notably in the 2013 Banking 
Communication, there was more attention to the long-term objectives.  
 
State aid was approved as an emergency measure with the objective of restoring confidence 
in the financial market and avoiding the risk of a disturbance of the national economy as a 
whole, with possible negative spill-overs to the whole EU economy.  
 
The Commission applied the compensatory measures as developed in the legal framework 
in the Case law. The avoidance of moral hazard played an important role in the design of 
compensatory measures and the approval of State aid in the Commission’s decisions. 
Limiting the aid to the minimum necessary and an appropriate own contribution (burden 
sharing) to the costs were the main means through which the Commission aimed at restoring 
financial stability in the long-term.  
 
It is not possible to say that long-term impact prevailed over short-term impact, or the other 
way around. However, the Case law shows that when taking measures with a short term 
objective, the long term consequences were also taken into account. Furthermore, the Case 
law shows a gradual shift from short-term impact to long-term impact.  
 
There is a clear connection between the development of the balancing between short-term 
and long-term consequences between the Legal Framework and the Case Law. This flows 
from the application of the legal framework to the Case law.  
 
 
 
Both the legal framework and the Case law responded to the changing situation of the 
financial crisis, from a very severe situation in the financial sector at the beginning of the 
crisis in 2008 to one that became less harsh, by 2009. In the beginning of the financial crisis 
the legal Framework and the Case law focused more on short-term objectives, whereas at a 
later stage during the crisis, the long-term objectives became more a focal point for the 
Commission. The objective of avoiding moral hazard remained a short-term as well as a 
long-term objective throughout the crisis.  
 
Evaluation of State aid measures 
State aid to banks during the financial crisis was beneficial because State aid helped to 
restore financial stability in some Member States. However, State Aid did not proof to be an 
effective tool for equal and endurable recovery across Europe, as the economic recovery 
was very fragile and unequal in the EU. 
 
By using effective tools to limit distortions of competition, State aid was also successful in 
maintaining competition between the banks. Based on the Commission’s analysis of the 
market structure of the banking sector, there were no significant distortions of competition as 
a consequence of the State aid.  
Possible solutions to handling similar problems which occurred during the 
financial crisis: the formation of a European Banking Union 
Prior and during the crisis the banking sector was regulated on a national level which meant 
that it was difficult for EU authorities to respond to the crisis in a coordinated manner. The 
lack of a supranational regulatory body was mentioned as one of the causes of the financial 
crisis. 
The creation of a Banking Union with a single supervisory and resolution mechanism could 
be a possible solution to handle similar problems in the future. Especially due to the relatively 
large proportion of cross border activities of banks, it is important to have a supranational 
body governing European Banking. With a supranational body in place, such as a European 
Banking Union, it will be possible to act in a coordinated manner in response to crisis 
situations.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Topic 
As a response to the financial crisis and the serious threat to the banking sector, almost all 
Member States gave aid to rescue the banks. Between October 2008 and March 2010 a total 
amount of nearly 10% of EU gross domestic product (GDP).3 Between 2008 and 2011, more 
than 1,6 trillion Euro4 was given as State aid to the financial sector. 5 
The European Commission (hereafter Commission) made more than 200 decisions in the 
financial services sector in the period between October 2008 and October 2010.6 ´Seldom 
have the Community rules on State aid been applied so frequently. Seldom has the definition 
of State aid presented more difficulty.’7 
This thesis focuses mainly on problems relating to State aid in the financial sector in the 
European Union (hereafter EU) during the financial crisis. It is interesting to investigate how 
the Commission approached the questions concerning approval or disapproval of national 
State aid to financial institutions during the crisis. It is especially interesting to analyze how 
the Commission balanced the interests of economic and financial stability and social benefits 
in the EU with market oriented disadvantages, such as distortion of competition between 
financial institutions in the EU. It is also interesting to investigate how distortions of 
competition were limited. Furthermore, it is useful to analyze the balancing between long-
term and short-term consequences of State aid, to see whether measures aimed at long-
term or short-term impact prevailed.     
The question arises whether State aid under the temporary State aid rules resulted in a 
distortion of competition. This question will be investigated through an evaluation of the 
effects on competition as a result of State aid measures taken during the financial crisis. If 
State aid resulted in distortions of competition, it is interesting to analyze to what extent and 
how market oriented disadvantages could have been prevented.  
Finally, I will investigate options for improvement in handling a similar situation, including the 
creation of a European banking Union. The European Banking Union might be a solution for 
the negative consequences in the financial sector. I will also look at which lessons can be 
drawn from this in the future, in order to minimize negative market oriented effects.     
                                                          
3
 Christian Ahlborn and Daniel Piccinin, ‘The Great Recession and other mishaps: the Commission’s policy of restructuring aid 
in a time of crisis’ in Erika Szyszczak (ed) Research Handbook on European State Aid Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
2011) 127 
4
 This is to 13% of total EU GDP. 
5
 Kelyn Bacon, European Union Law of State Aid, (2
nd
 edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 400  
6
 Thomas Jerstaedt and Marcus Pollar, ‘The Application of European Competition Law in the Financial Services Sector’ [2011]  
2, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 371, p.372 
7
 Phedon Nicolaides, ‘State Aid’, in Ioannis Kokkodoris and Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal Antitrust Law amidst Financial Crisis 
(Cambridge University Press 2010) 349, Quote by Andrea Biondi, Prof. Piet Eeckhout & James Flynn 
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1.2 Method and Demarcation 
The research is based on an analysis of relevant journal articles, books, Case law and 
legislation. A traditional legal dogmatic method is applied, with the respect for the hierarchy 
of norms and specific nature of Union law. 
 
For this analysis, I will make an assessment on how the Commission handled State aid for 
banks including an assessment of the legal framework used in order to balance the negative 
market oriented effects with the positive financial, economic and social effects of the State 
aid granted.  
 
I will also analyze a number of Cases from different Member States. As there are hundreds 
of Cases on State aid in the financial sector, a selection of Cases needs to be made. I 
choose the Cases based on their importance in terms of the amount of State aid granted and 
the time period in which they were decided. The focus will be on the period between 2008 
and 2009 as the most significant developments in the domain of State aid to the financial 
sector took place during this period. Attention is also given to the period after 2009 to see the 
effects of the decisions taken in 2008 and 2009. I will also address the 2013 Banking 
Communication which replaced the 2008 Banking Communication. 
 
Regarding the doctrine, an important starting point has been a chapter by Christian Ahlborn 
and Daniel Piccinin called ´The Great Recession and other mishaps: the Commission´s 
policy of restructuring aid in a time of crisis´ from the ´Research Handbook of European State 
Aid Law´.   
 
Based on the research I am expressing my own point of view on the issues as well.  
1.3 Structure  
In order to understand the Commission’s decisions on State aid in the financial sector it is 
necessary to give an overview of the legal framework in relation to State aid to firms in 
difficulty. Secondly the legal framework in relation to State aid in the financial sector, 
established by the Commission to handle the negative consequences of the financial crisis, 
is described and analyzed. This is followed by an overview and analysis of the legal 
framework and Case law addressing the short-term and long-term impact of the State aid.  
The advantages and disadvantages of state aid in the financial sector are addressed. This 
includes an outline on how State aid can have a negative effect on the economy such as 
distortion of competition between banks. Then an overview of the manner in which the 
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Commission balanced social and economic benefits against market oriented disadvantages 
is given.  
This is followed by an evaluation of the effects of State aid, which includes a review and 
investigation of the means used by the Commission to limit the negative consequences of 
State aid such as undue distortions of competition.  
I will also look for alternative ways in order to prevent market oriented disadvantages as 
much as possible and maximize the positive economic and social effects of State aid. This 
includes an investigation of the option and possible effects of the creation of a European 
Banking Union.  
In the conclusion the question on how the Commission approached the approval of State aid 
to national banks during the financial crisis will be answered. This will include the final 
conclusion regarding the balancing of the advantages and disadvantages of State aid and 
the balancing between short-term and long-term consequences. The question on whether a 
European Banking Union is a possible solution to deal with State aid during a financial crisis 
will also be addressed.       
Descriptive chapters will finish with a summary capturing the main points of the chapter. 
Chapters which are both descriptive and also contain an analysis will finish with a summary 
and a conclusion. Chapters which are mainly comprised of an analysis will only have a 
conclusion at the end.  
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2 Legal framework of EU State aid law 
The general rules on EU State aid are relevant for State aid given in the financial services 
sector. Therefore they are presented underneath. Furthermore, an outline is given of what is 
considered State aid in the financial services sector. The Commission`s discretion in the field 
of EU State aid law is also discussed.  
2.1 Rules on EU State aid 
In Article 107 (1) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (hereafter TFEU) 
the concept of State aid under EU law is defined. 
‘Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or 
through state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, 
in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal 
market.’  
This Article shows that aid is incompatible with the internal market, unless the aid is 
permitted by other Treaty provisions. Article 107 (2) and (3) TFEU define when aid is 
compatible with the internal market.8  
There is no definition of State aid. However, the Court`s interpretation of Article 107 (1) 
TFEU provides criteria for a measure to fall within Article 107(1) TFEU. Based on Case Law 
these criteria can be summarized as follows: 
a) ‘There must be aid in the sense of an economic advantage; 
b)  The aid must be granted directly or indirectly through State resources and must be 
imputable to the State; 
c) The measure must favor certain undertakings or the production of certain goods and;  
d) The measure must be liable to distort competition and affect trade between Member 
States.’9 
2.2 General principles under Article 107 (3) in relation to firms in 
difficulty 
State aid rules are the most extensively used available policy of the EU. State aid to private 
firms is covered by Article 107 TFEU. This Article is important as it lays down the test for 
State aids.10  
                                                          
8
 Kelyn Bacon, European Union Law of State Aid, (2
nd
 edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 20  
9
 Kelyn Bacon, European Union Law of State Aid, (2
nd
 edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 20-21  
10
 Paul Graig and Gráinne De Burca, EU Law, text, cases and materials, (5
th
 edition, Oxford University Press 2011) 1087 
5 
 
Under Article 107 (3) TFEU the Commission is given the power to give exemptions to the aid 
prohibited under Article 107 (1) TFEU. The Commission has a wide discretion in the 
application of Article 107 (3) TFEU.11  
For State aid in the financial sector Article 107 (3) (b) and (c) TFEU are particularly 
important. This Article says: 
1. Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State 
or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible 
with the internal market. 
3. The following may be considered to be compatible with the internal market: 
(b) aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European 
interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State; 
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an 
extent contrary to the common interest; 
 
In case aid is not covered by a block exemption, the Commission applies guidelines, to 
assess whether the aid may be approved. If no guidelines are applicable, then the 
Commission applies Article 107 (3) directly.12  
One feature of the application of Article 107 (3) (c) is that aid can be justified as judged 
by national criteria. However, the impact of the aid on EU trade, and its sectoral 
repercussions at EU level should still be considered.13  
 
The Commission has applied the principle of compensatory justification in the application of 
Article 107 (3). This means that the aid should lead to a contribution of the Union objectives 
as contained in the derogations from Article 107 (3).14  
 
Every decision that the Commission makes under Article 107 (3) includes a balancing test in 
which the positive effects of the aid measure are balanced against the possible negative 
effects, in particular distortion of trade and competition. In the balancing test the following 
questions are asked: 
                                                          
11
  Kelyn Bacon, European Union Law of State Aid, (2
nd
 edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 100 
12
 Bacon, European Union Law of State Aid, (2
nd
 edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 100-101 
13
 Paul Graig and Gráinne De Burca, EU Law, text, cases and materials, (5
th
 edition, Oxford University Press 2011) 1096 
14
 Paul Graig and Gráinne De Burca, EU Law, text, cases and materials, (5
th
 edition, Oxford University Press 2011) 1085.  
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a) ‘Is the aid measure aimed at a well-defined objective of common interest? 
b) Is the aid well designed to deliver the objective of common interest? In particular: 
- Is the aid measure an appropriate instrument? 
- Is there an incentive effect? 
- Is the aid measure proportionate? 
c) Are the distortions of competition and effect on trade sufficiently limited, so that the 
overall balance is positive?’15 
2.3 What is State aid in the banking sector? 
The rules on State aid are applicable to the banking sector. Before the financial crisis, in the 
nineties the Commission approved State aid to Crédit Lyonnais 16 and Banco di Napoli 17.18  
Four types of aid measures can be classified under the so called crisis framework: funding 
guarantees, liquidity measures, recapitalization and asset relief measures.19   
Government measures were adopted to combat the financial crisis. They can fall under State 
aid if ‘they could not have been obtained from private market participants under normal 
market conditions’.20 The ‘private investor test’ is used to determine whether a measure can 
be qualified as State aid or not. Under the ‘private investor test’, an assessment is made 
whether the same advantage conferred to by a State to a firm could have been given by a 
private investor under the same conditions. Applying the ‘private investor test’ on the 
measures taken by States to combat the financial crisis, almost all state support in the 
financial sector is considered as State aid.21 
Sometimes private investors and the State intervene alongside in the financial sector. In 
some Cases, depending on the situation of the private participation, the measure may fall 
outside Article 107 (1) TFEU. Two Cases in which the Commission had to decide on whether 
there was State aid, were the Hypo Steiermark Case22 and the Dexia Case23, in which two 
different conclusions were reached. In the Hypo Steiermark Case the Commission concluded 
that there was no aid as the private investor was responsible for 75% of the capital 
increase.24 In the Hypo Steiermark Case the private investor contributed to the same extent 
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as in the Dexia Case, but the Commission came to the opposite conclusion, as the private 
investor, intervened to rescue the bank under entirely ‘abnormal conditions’. As a 
consequence they could not be considered a private investor as this principle can only be 
applied under normal market circumstances.25   
State aid can exist if the bank is partly or completely sold. According to the Commission 
there is no aid if the deal occurs under non-discriminatory competitive conditions and at a 
market price. However, the Commission takes the special circumstances of the crisis into 
account. This was done in the Cases of Fortis Bank and Fortis Bank Luxembourg26. These 
Cases concerned the sale of Fortis Banque to BNP Paribas.27 These Cases will be further 
analyzed in the following chapters.  
2.4 The Commission`s discretion in State aid in the financial sector 
The Commission has a large degree of discretion in allowing or prohibiting State aid. This 
discretion is only scrutinized to a limited extent by the Community Courts. During the 
financial crisis the Commission used its important position to change the operations of the 
European banking system.28  
The Commission imposed its objectives on Member States and aid beneficiaries through 
Commission Communications and Commitment Decisions. Commission Communications 
form a guidance on the manner in which the Commission will use its discretion concerning 
certain aid measures. They contain the conditions that the aid measures need to fulfil, in 
order to receive a clearance decision from the Commission.29  
Commitment Decisions were used by the Commission to impose behavioral restraints on 
banks. In addition, the Commission required banks to change their business structure and 
activities in the future.30      
2.5 Summary of the legal framework of EU State aid law  
In Article 107 (1) TFEU the concept of State aid under EU law is defined. Criteria for State 
aid are described in the Case law. Article 107 (2) and (3) TFEU define when aid is 
compatible with the internal market. Article 107 (3) TFEU provides for exemptions to the aid 
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prohibited under Article 107 (1) TFEU. For State aid in the financial sector Article 107 (3) (b) 
and (c) TFEU are particularly important. 
The rules on State aid are applicable to the financial sector. The four types of aid measures 
are funding guarantees, liquidity measures, recapitalization and asset relief measures. The 
“private investor test” is used as a tool to determine whether a measure meets the criteria of 
State aid or not.  
The Commission has a large degree of discretion in allowing or prohibiting State aid. The 
Commission uses Commission Communications and Commitment Decisions to impose its 
objectives on Member States and aid beneficiaries. 
9 
 
3   The EU legal framework on State aid in the banking sector during 
the financial crisis 
The Commission developed a legal framework on State aid rules during the financial crisis.  
An overview of the legal framework for State aid control in the banking sector during the 
financial crisis is given below. 
3.1 Pre-crisis, Article 107 (3) (c) and the Rescue and Restructuring 
Guidelines as a legal basis for State aid 
In general, for transparency and predictability reasons, the Commission develops Guidelines 
for cases that are not covered by a block exemption. The Commission is bound by these 
guidelines, provided they do not depart from the rules in the Treaty and do not affect the 
scope of secondary legislation.31   
Before the crisis started, the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines32 and Article 107 (3) (c) 
were used to approve State aid. These rules continued to be applied in the early stages of 
the financial crisis, such as in the Cases of Roskilde Bank33, Sachsen LB34 and Northern 
Rock35. 36 A more detailed overview of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines and their 
application in the financial services sector is presented underneath.  
The Commission developed the Guidelines37 on Restructuring aid. The objectives of aid as 
stated in these guidelines are as follows: 
1. viability is restored; 
2. the aid is in proportion to the restructuring costs and benefits; 
3. undue distortions of competition should be avoided;  
4. and the restructuring plan should be fully implemented.38 
 
The Commission has quite a large degree of discretion to the approach to State aid. This 
became noticeable in the adjustment of State aid rules in relation to the banking sector 
during the financial crisis.39    
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Under the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines, restructuring aid can only be justified if the  
distortion caused by State aid, can be justified by other social and economic benefits. Three 
criteria are used for the assessment of aid and the restructuring plan. Firstly, the Commission 
is focusing on viability of the company in the long-run. This means that the company should 
not ask for aid again. Secondly, the aid and the plan should not lead to distortions of 
competition. Thirdly, the aid should be as minimum as possible and the company should 
contribute as well.40  
Aid with the objective of development of certain economic activities can be aid given to 
individual undertakings. For State aid to private undertakings to be approved, it must be in 
line with the common market. In general, aid for rescue and restructuring purposes, is 
normally not considered to be in the common interest of the EU. 41 It is the Commission´s 
duty to assess whether aid for rescue and restructuring purposes is not against the common 
interest. 42    
There is a distinction between ´rescue´ and ´restructuring´ aid. Rescue aid is temporary 
whereas restructuring aid is aimed at financing recapitalization and reorganization and has 
long-term consequences.43  
3.2 The application of Article 107 (3) (c) 
Normally rescue and restructuring aid is granted under Art. 107 (3) (c) TFEU. Under this 
Article aid is allowed to ‘facilitate the development of certain activities or of certain economic 
areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to 
the common interest’.44  
As noted above, in the first phase of the financial crisis Art. 107 (3) (c) TFEU and the Rescue 
and Restructuring Guidelines were used by the Commission.45 In this phase the Commission 
did not consider the aid to be necessary to ‘remedy a serious disturbance in the Economy of 
a Member State’, which is needed to use Article 107 (3) (b). Therefore in the first Cases 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
39
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 Bruce Lyons and Minyan Zhu, ‘Compensating Competitors for Restoring Competition? EU Regulation of State Aid for Banks 
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 Christian Ahlborn and Daniel Piccinin, ‘The Great Recession and other mishaps: the Commission’s policy of restructuring aid 
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decided by the Commission  (e.g Northern Rock, Sachsen LB and IKB), Article 107 (3) (c) 
was applied.46  
The Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines were not specific and detailed enough to deal with 
the problems as a result of the crisis.47  Due to problems in a number of banking Cases, the 
Commission had to develop a new and more specific legal framework ‘outside the strict 
application of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines’.48 
3.3 Article 107 (3) (b) as the legal basis for state aid 
Until 2008, only under exceptional circumstances, aid was approved by the Commission 
under Article 107 (3) (b). Under Article 107 (3) (b), aid to remedy a serious disturbance in the 
economy of a Member State, may be authorized by the Commission. To be able to rely on 
this Article, the serious disturbance had to affect the economy of a Member State as a whole 
and aid should have benefited more than one operator or sector. Aid which only benefited 
one operator or one sector could not fall within this exception.49  
Since the financial crisis started in 2008, the Commission changed its approach on the 
applicability of Article 107 (3) (b). Since then, Article 107 (b) could also be relied on for 
measures taken to support financial undertakings and other undertakings as a result of the 
financial crisis.50  
The Commission’s initial objectives were identified as follows; ‘to preserve financial stability 
and deal with the risk of insolvencies and restore lending’. The main aim was ‘to preserve the 
single market, to protect competitors when rivals receive aid, and to move towards 
eliminating state support’.51    
In the 2008 Banking Communication it is stipulated that, a crisis which affects  the stability of 
individual banks or the banking system as a whole, and creates a risk that the whole 
economy of a Member State will be affected in a negative way, may be a sufficient reason  to 
rely on Article 107 3 (b).52  
 
                                                          
46
 Christian Ahlborn and Daniel Piccinin, ‘The Great Recession and other mishaps: the Commission’s policy of restructuring aid 
in a time of crisis’ in Erika Szyszczak (ed) Research Handbook on European State Aid Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
2011) 139 
47
 Philipp Werner and Martina Maier, ‘Procedure in Crisis? Overview and Assessment of the Commission’s State Aid Procedure 
during the Current Crisis [2009] 2 European State Aid Law Quarterly 177, 179 
48
Philipp Werner and Martina Maier, ‘Procedure in Crisis? Overview and Assessment of the Commission’s State Aid Procedure 
during the Current Crisis [2009] 2 European State Aid Law Quarterly 177, 179 
49
 Kelyn Bacon, European Union Law of State Aid, (2
nd
 edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 109  
50
 Kelyn Bacon, European Union Law of State Aid, (2
nd
 edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 109 
51
 Bruce Lyons and Minyan Zhu, ‘Compensating Competitors for Restoring Competition? EU Regulation of State Aid for Banks 
During the Financial Crisis’  [2013] Journal of Industry Competition and Trade 39, 41 
52
  Communication from the Commission – The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial 
institutions in the context of the current global crisis [2008] O.J. 2008 C 270/08, para 9 &  Kelyn Bacon, European Union Law of 
State Aid, (2
nd
 edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 109 
12 
 
3.4 The Crisis Framework 
The European Commission’s State aid policy between 2008 and 2010 consisted of four main 
objectives. The Commission wanted to:  
1. have a well organized rescue and restructuring process for banks and no 
discrimination in the granting of deposit guarantees; 
2. allow the recapitalization of fundamentally sound banks in an impartial manner; 
3.  avoiding distortions of competition;  
4. and review the State aid measures and their exit.53 
 
In response to the financial crisis, the so called Crisis Framework was developed by the 
Commission, with Article 107 (3) (b) as its legal basis.54  The Commission adopted five 
Communications55 in order to deal with the problems as a result of the crisis.56 These five 
Communications are the: 
1. 2008 Banking Communication; 
2. Recapitalization Communication; 
3. Impaired Assets Communication;  
4. Restructuring Communication; 
5. And the 2013 Banking Communication which replaced the 2008 Banking 
Communication. 
3.4.1 The 2008 Banking Communication 
The 2008 Banking Communication was introduced on the 13th of October 2008. Article 107 
(3) (b) was used as a legal basis for the 2008 Banking Communication.57 During the crisis, 
the 2008 Banking Communication was used to ‘give guidance on the application of State aid 
rules to State support schemes and individual assistance for financial institutions’.58 In this 
Communication, it was noted that the measures taken should not lead to unnecessary 
distortions of competitions between financial institutions or negative spillover effects on other 
Member States.59 Apart from minimizing competition, all support measures needed to be 
‘well-targeted in order to be able to achieve effectively the objective of remedying a serious 
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disturbance in the economy and proportionate to the challenge faced, not going beyond what 
is required to attain this effect.’60  
By applying these criteria, compliance with State aid rules and the fundamental freedoms in 
the Treaty, such as non-discrimination, needed to be taken into account. 61  This was 
emphasized under paragraph 18 of the 2008 Banking Communication in which it said that all 
institutions in the Member State concerned should be covered by the guarantee aid scheme. 
This is also related to minimizing distortions on competition as this might arise when certain 
financial institutions are excluded from the guarantee aid scheme.62 In addition, measures 
based on Article 107 (b) could only be taken as long as it could be justified by the specific 
situation of the financial crisis.63   
 
In the 2008 Banking Communication it was stipulated that recapitalization of vulnerable 
systemically relevant financial institutions was important with the aim of protecting the 
depositors' interests and the stability of the system. The national level remained relevant as 
public intervention had to be decided on a national level but there needed to be a 
coordinated framework taking EU principles into account.64 
 
One important characteristic of this Communication as well as of the Restructuring 
Communication, was that a distinction was made between banks that were suffering from 
liquidity effects as a result of the financial crisis, referred to as ‘fundamentally sound’ banks, 
and the banks that had endogenous problems, referred to as ´fundamentally unsound 
banks´. According to the 2008 Banking Communication ‘fundamentally sound’ banks did not 
need much restructuring.65  
The 2008 Banking Communication says that ‘under the prevailing circumstances, the crisis 
equally affects financial institutions that are fundamentally sound and whose difficulties stem 
exclusively from the general market conditions which have severely restricted access to 
liquidity. Long-term viability of these institutions may require less substantial restructuring.’66 
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3.4.2 The Recapitalization Communication 
The 2008 Banking Communication was primarily used to ensure lending to the real economy, 
rather than a rescue measure. Therefore the Commission introduced the Recapitalisation 
Communication, which contains a more detailed framework for recapitalization measures.67  
According to this Communication, recapitalization schemes were recognized as one of the 
main measures that Member States could take to preserve financial stability and a well 
functioning financial market.68 One of the aims of this document was to make sure that the 
financial stability of the banks was restored. It is important to note that ‘state interventions 
must be proportional, temporary and distinguishes between fundamentally sound and less-
well-performing banks’.69 This distinction was used in the balancing between the objectives of 
financial stability and competition. Furthermore, this separation was taken into account when 
determining the recapitalization measures.70 Fundamentally sound banks did not require any 
restructuring under the Recapitalisation Communication.71  
Banks with a higher risk profile had to pay more. Entry criteria based on the different risk 
profiles, had to be considered by the Member States. Hereby the situation of banks which 
face difficulties due to the crisis had to be taken into account.  Furthermore, distressed banks 
may accept lower remuneration in the short term whereas financially sound banks had to be 
entitled to relatively low rates of entry into any capitalization.72  
Like the 2008 Banking Communication, the Recapitalization Communication emphasized the 
need to prevent distortions of competition.73  Furthermore, as stipulated in the 2008 Banking 
Communication, recapitalizations are subject to regular review.74  
3.4.3 The Impaired Assets Communication 
The Impaired Assets Communication gives a detailed framework for asset relief measures. It 
was introduced as a reaction to the problems in the economy, which had not been solved 
through the measures taken since 2008. Due to the uncertainty about the valuation and 
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localization for impaired assets, these measures did not lead to an increase in lending in the 
real economy. Therefore, Member States were considering relief for impaired bank assets.75   
The Impaired Assets Communication can be seen as a return to the Rescue and 
Restructuring Aid Guidelines, as in two decisions made in this phase, Commerzbank76 and 
West LB,  the remedies imposed on the banks were similar to the ones imposed under the 
Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.77 
Apart from measures aimed at immediate effects, this Communication also stressed the 
need to take long term considerations into account by implementing asset relief measures. 
Furthermore, like the other two Communications as described above, distortion of 
competition should be avoided when taking asset relief measures.78 In addition, when taking 
asset relief measures, the budgetary situation of Member States was taken into account.79   
One important difference with the previous Communications was that there was no difference 
between ‘fundamentally sound’ and ‘unsound’ banks. Banks could not profit from having the 
status of being ‘fundamentally sound’ under the Recapitalization Guidelines to avoid the 
obligation to restructure. Since the Impaired Assets Communication, the Commission started 
to point out the need for deep restructuring.80        
3.4.4 Financial Restructuring Communication 
The Financial Restructuring Communication was finished in July 2009. 81  Under these 
guidelines the Commission became tougher in its position towards the restructuring 
obligations of banks. The recipients of aid were under the obligation to restructure in such a 
way that it would increase competition in the banking sectors. This was done through 
compensatory measures which required banks to divest in national markets. 82  These 
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measures were applied in the Cases of LBG, ING, RBS and KBC.83 These Cases will be 
further analysed in the next chapters.  
The Restructuring Communication stipulated the assessment of the restructuring 
requirements for banks that received aid in the financial crisis. This assessment was done in 
three steps: 
a) An analysis was made of the bank’s problems in order to create a policy with the aim 
of restoring viability. 
b) The design of the restructuring plan was analyzed to make sure there is realistic 
timing to make the necessary implementation steps.  
c) The principle of appropriate burden sharing/ own contribution between the Member 
State and the beneficiary banks was applied, keeping the whole situation of the 
financial sector in mind.  
d) The enforcement of compensatory measures aimed at limiting distortions of 
competition by a rescued bank and to limit any competitive advantage for banks that 
were not aided.84 
 
The Restructuring Communication, in association with the other Communications were 
prolonged twice. In the First Prolongation the distinction between ‘fundamentally sound’ and 
‘unsound’ banks was taken away.85  
3.4.5 The 2013 Banking Communication 
The 2008 Banking Communication was replaced by the 2013 Banking Communication on the 
first of August 2013. This Communication forms the most important source of guidance in 
terms of the procedure for granting of State aid to banks and for the requirements as to own 
contribution and burden sharing by the recipient and their stakeholders.86 
Like in the other Crisis Communications, financial stability, while at the same time keeping 
distortions of competition to the minimum, remains the objective of the 2013 Banking 
Communication.87  
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The new Communication takes the unequal economic recovery of Member States, the 
fragility of the financial markets and the difficulties in the autonomous debt market into 
account. In addition, the integrity of the internal market is addressed.88   
In the 2013 Banking Communication, it is noted that the previous Banking Communications 
did not lead to financial stability in the long term, as Member states did not go beyond the 
minimum requirements for burden sharing. Therefore in this Communication, it is argued that 
the minimum requirements for burden sharing should be raised.89  
Furthermore, when applying State aid rules to individual cases, the Commission takes the 
specific situation in each Member State into account. It will also undertake a proportionate 
assessment of the long-term viability of the banks.90  
The 2013 Banking Communication addresses the weaknesses of the earlier 2008 Banking 
Communication in the sense that restructuring efforts for individual beneficiaries were often 
delayed which resulted in higher costs for the taxpayers. One way to solve this problem, was 
to approve the bank’s restructuring plan, before the approval of recapitalization and impaired 
assets measures.91   
3.5 Summary of the response to the financial crisis  
The response to the financial crisis can be summarized as follows: 
1. Before October 2008, all Cases were dealt with under Article 107 (3) (c). 
2. Between October 2008 and late February 2009 Article 107 (3) (b) was used as a legal 
base.  
3. Since late February 2009 Article 107 (3) (b) was applied and there was a return to the 
application of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.  
4. Between July 2009 and December 2009 the Commission started to use the Financial 
Restructuring Guidelines.92  
5. In July 2013 the 2008 Banking Communication was replaced by the 2013 Banking 
Communication. 
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Prior to and in the early stages of the crisis the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines93 and 
Article 107 (3) (c) were used to approve State aid. The distortion of the aid under the Rescue 
and Restructuring Guidelines could only be justified by other social and economic benefits.  
From October 2008, the Commission developed a new and more specific legal framework 
consisting of the 2008 Banking Communication, the Recapitalization Communication, the 
Impaired Assets Communication, the Restructuring Communication and the 2013 Banking 
Communication. 
 
Under the 2008 Communication, State aid should not lead to unnecessary distortions of 
competitions between financial institutions or negative spillover effects on other Member 
States. Furthermore, all measures had to be proportionate and effective as a remedy to the 
serious disturbance in the economy. There was a distinction between ‘fundamentally sound’ 
and ‘fundamentally unsound’ banks.    
 
The Commission introduced the Recapitalisation Communication, under which 
recapitalization schemes were recognized as one of the main measures that Member States 
could take to preserve financial stability and a well functioning financial market. Measures 
taken under the Recapitalization Communication should prevent distortions of competition. 
The Impaired Assets Communication was introduced as a reaction to the problems in the 
economy, which had not been solved through the measures taken since 2008. 
Under the Financial Restructuring Communication the Commission became stricter in its 
position towards the restructuring obligations of banks. The recipients of aid had to 
restructure so that it would increase competition in the banking sectors, which was done 
through compensatory measures.  
The 2008 Banking Communication was replaced by the 2013 Banking Communication. 
Financial stability, while at the same time keeping distortions of competition to the minimum, 
remains the objective of the 2013 Banking Communication.94 In this Communication the 
unequal economic recovery of Member States was taken into consideration and it was 
argued that the minimum requirements for burden sharing were raised.  
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3.6 Conclusion 
In response to the financial crisis the Commission approached the questions concerning 
national State aid to financial institutions, by developing a new legal framework with Article 
107 (3) (b) as its legal basis. This legal framework was more detailed and specific to deal 
with the crisis situation than the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.  
The Commission switched from using Article 107 (3) (c) to Article 107 (3) (b) in approving 
State aid. Decisions were made using the 2008 Banking Communication which was later 
replaced by the 2013 Banking Communication. In the latter more attention was given to 
uneven recovery between Member States. Both Communications have financial stability as 
its aim, while at the same time keeping distortions of competition to the minimum. With the 
introduction of the Financial Restructuring Communication, the Commission became tougher 
towards companies’ restructuring obligations. The 2013 Communication also shows a stricter 
approach towards the approval of State aid, as it was noted that the minimum requirements 
for burden sharing should be raised and to approve the bank’s restructuring plan, before the 
approval of recapitalization and impaired assets measures.  
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4 Market oriented disadvantages and social and economic 
advantages of State aid in the financial sector 
 
State aid in the financial sector has economic and social advantages as well as economic 
disadvantages. These have played a role in the Commission’s decisions and legal framework 
and will therefore be presented below. 
4.1 Economic and social advantages of aid to firms in difficulty in general 
State aid for rescue and restructuring purposes is a very sensitive political area of State aid 
policy. Therefore it is considered to be an area of concern for the Commission.95   
In general, the effect on social welfare is more likely to be negative than positive. However, 
under special circumstances, there are strong social policy justifications, that would outweigh 
the economic considerations.96 Therefore State aid may be used for economic and social 
purposes. This is particularly true for companies in difficulty that are important providers of 
employment in certain regions. The collapse of such a company would lead to 
unemployment, thereby creating negative social and economic consequences, which would 
outweigh the negative consequences for the tax payers and competitors.97 Therefore, in 
some circumstances, State aid may serve to prevent a business from closing, which would 
have led to negative social consequences such as unemployment, as well as negative 
effects on the local economy. The closing of one company may also lead to the creation of a 
monopoly or oligopoly situation.  This would result in anti-competitive effects on the market. 
Therefore political, social and economic consequences should be balanced in State aid 
policy.98 In general, whether the social and economic benefits outweigh the negative effects 
on competition and for the tax payers should be assessed on a case by case basis, taking 
the social and economic context into account.99 
Due to the reasons as outlined above, the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines, only allow 
for restructuring aid in certain very limited situations. It may be justified under ‘social or 
regional policy considerations, the need to take into account the beneficial role played by 
small and Medium- Sized companies in the economy’ or in order to maintain ‘a competitive 
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market structure when the demise of firms would lead to a monopoly structure or a tight 
oligopolistic situation’.100 
4.2 Economic and social advantages of rescue and restructuring aid in the 
banking sector 
Banking is considered to be a very vulnerable sector, as problems in one major financial 
institution, can possibly lead to a collapse of the whole banking system and in turn can lead 
to a financial crisis.101 In some instances, the social costs of rescuing a bank can be less 
than the costs of a failing bank. 102 The social and economic advantages of State aid will be 
discussed underneath.  
4.2.1 Integrity of the internal market and financial stability 
One of the main objectives of State aid control in the financial sector is to preserve the 
integrity of the internal market and to ensure financial stability. Economic stability is one 
important objective of State aid to the banking sector. A functioning banking system is 
considered to be crucial for the performance of the economy.103  
4.2.2 Protection of the wider economy and prevention of a deepening of the financial 
crisis 
A well-functioning banking system is a prerequisite for the performance of the economy as a 
whole. State aid in the financial sector has been used to avoid a total collapse of the financial 
system and to decrease the chance of a continuation and deepening of the financial crisis.104 
Protecting the national economy as a whole has also been mentioned by the Commission as 
one of the aims and positive effects of the state aid measures in the Case law. This can be 
seen from the Bank of Ireland Case, in which an avoidance of a risk of a serious disturbance 
in the Irish economy was seen as a justification for the aid measures.105  
 
Similar to in the Bank of Ireland Case, the objective of protecting the economy as a whole 
and maintaining confidence in the financial sector has also been mentioned in the Case of 
Maxbank. In contrast to the Bank of Ireland Case, which concerned a big bank in Ireland, this 
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Case was about rescue aid of a small bank in Denmark. It was argued by the Commission 
that the bankruptcy of a small bank could lead to a significant decrease in trust in the 
financial system and could have a negative effect on the Danish economy. 106  The 
recapitalization Case of Dexia107 which involved a capital injection of 6,4 billion Euro’s,  also 
shows that the approval of large-scale rescue measures are approved by the Commission 
with the aim of preventing a continuation of the financial crisis.108   
 
The Cyprus Popular Bank Case also shows the need to protect the national economy 
through State aid measures. Cyprus Popular Bank is the second-largest banking institution in 
Cyprus and is a systematically important bank for Cyprus. The Commission argued that 
bankruptcy would lead to a serious disturbance in the Cypriot economy. Therefore, the 
Commission notes that the measure was appropriate.109 
4.2.3 Protection of employment 
From the two Cases that were decided under the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines and 
Article 107 (3) (c), it becomes clear that social consequences have played a major role in the 
Commission´s decisions. The Northern Rock Case shows that the aid measures were 
important to remedy negative consequences. Due to the State aid measures unemployment 
was avoided. Here the Commission balanced the aid against the possible negative effect of 
aggressive behavior by the bank.110 In the Case of Sachsen LB, the State aid measure was 
justified based on serious social difficulties. Without these measures Sachsen LB would be 
liquidated which would have resulted in unemployment. This was balanced against the 
negative effects of the aid. Like in the Northern Rock Case, the Commission noted that 
negative spillover effects would be avoided as the bank was not capable of acting 
aggressively.111 
4.2.4 Protection of a competitive market and increase in competition 
Since the introduction of the Restructuring Communication, the Commission used State aid 
measures to increase competition on the market. The existing Case law decided under the 
Restructuring Communication, shows that an increase in competition was an important 
motive for the Commission in approving the aid measures. One example was the ING Case 
in which the measures taken resulted in an increase in competition on the Dutch retail 
market. In ING’s restructuring plan it was stipulated that ING would carve out an entity, 
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WUH/Interadvies, in the Dutch retail market. Given the highly concentrated market, the good 
market share in the mortgage business and consumer loans of the newly created entity, 
there would be an increase in competition in the Dutch retail banking market.112 
Other Cases in which the restructuring plans contributed to the increase in competition were 
KBC and Lloyds.113 In the Case of Lloyds, the divestment entailed 600 branches in the UK 
market, representing 4,6% in the personal current account market. The newly created 
business would be viable and would be capable of competing in the retail banking business 
in the UK. It was seen as an appropriate means to increase competition in the highly 
concentrated UK retail market.114  
In a restructuring Case of the Royal Bank of Scotland, the Commission mentioned that a 
divestment helped to increase competition, as the divested business would be a viable 
business in the future and would be a competitor on the highly concentrated UK banking 
market.115 
4.3 Market oriented disadvantages of Rescue and Restructuring aid in 
general 
Rescue and Restructuring aid is among the type of aid that is most likely to lead to distortions 
and has led to several controversial State aid decisions in the past. Therefore the 
Commission noted that State aid under the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines should 
remain limited. 116 
4.3.1 Distortions of competition 
Rescue and Restructuring aid might lead to distortions of competition.117 Firstly State aid can 
lead to a decreased incentive to compete, invest and succeed. Companies might have the 
perception that they will not be able to completely profit from their investments, as their 
competitors will receive aid from the State. Furthermore, even when there is no aid given but 
only an expectation of receiving aid, companies will be less likely to invest and to compete. 
As a consequence, State aid to firms in difficulty can have negative consequences for the 
market and the economy.118   
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Rescue and restructuring aid can lead to distortions of competition through an increase in 
market power. However, this is unlikely to happen as the recipient does not always have the 
capability for aggressive expansion.119  
4.3.2 Moral hazard 
State aid may also lead to moral hazard. ‘Moral hazard refers to someone’s willingness to 
take excessive risks just because they know someone else will come and save them from 
the possible negative consequences.’120 In the domain of economy this occurs when there is 
‘asymmetric information, where one entity (the principal) does not know how another (the 
agent) will behave in the future’.121 If companies notice that other companies receive aid, 
they might engage in risky activities as well, as they might think that the aid would also be 
available to them.122   
The creation of moral hazard is expected to have more serious and long-lasting 
consequences than minor distortions of the market. The repetition of State aid may sooner or 
later lead to the assumption that ‘certain undertakings are “too big to fail” (or too politically 
important to fail), and thus perpetuate overly risky or inefficient business practices.’ 123    
Moral hazard has played a key role in the creation of the financial crisis.124 Examples of 
moral hazard from the financial industry are: 
 Selling a financial product to someone, knowing that it is not in the interest of that 
person to buy it. An example is a mortgage. 
 Paying excessive bonuses out of funds that are managed on another person’s 
behalf. 
 Take risks that others have to bear.125 
 
Moral hazard had an immense affect on the financial sector, particularly due to the manner 
the employees were paid by the financial institutions. In the years preceding the crisis, 
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bonuses had expanded aggressively. All big investment banks126 paid increasingly higher 
bonuses. This bonus system, which was aimed at short-term profits within one year, 
triggered risky behavior with catastrophic effects. Some companies nearly collapsed.127  
These moral hazards are part of the financial system and the economy. It is crucial to keep 
them under acceptable control by means of institutional control. If there is no proper control 
of moral hazards, this might lead to excessive risk taking, as many moral hazards include 
increased risk-taking behavior.128   
The importance of controlling moral hazard during the financial crisis is mentioned in 
the 2009 Restructuring Communication.  
‘The current scale of the public intervention necessary for financial stability and 
the possible limits to normal burden sharing are bound to create even greater 
moral hazard that needs to be properly corrected to prevent perverse incentives 
and excessively risky behavior from reoccurring in the future and to pave the way 
for a rapid return to normal market conditions without State aid support.’129 
The 2013 Banking Communication mentions the issue of moral hazard in connection 
with the authorization of liquidation aid.  
4.4 Market oriented disadvantages of Rescue and Restructuring aid in the 
banking sector 
As State aid can lead to distortions of competition, this was also one of the main concerns by 
the Commission. In the Restructuring Communication the negative impacts on competition 
were outlined in detail. It says that State aid is considered to be supporting banks that relied 
on unsustainable business practices and those which accumulated excessive risk. In normal 
market circumstances these companies would exit the market. ‘State aid prolongs past 
distortions of competition created by excessive risk-taking and unsustainable business 
practice’. 130  State aid is supporting the market power of those receiving aid, while 
discouraging the incentives to invest, compete and innovate for non-beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, State aid will have consequences for the functioning of the single market, as 
other Member States can get an unfair share of the burden of structural adjustment and 
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accompanying social and economic problems. In addition, this will lead to decreased 
incentives for cross-border activities.131 
The Commission also expressed its concern about moral hazard. This was also mentioned in 
the Case law.132 The Commission was worried that if State aid would be granted without any 
compensatory measures, banks would work with risky strategies which could arise in a new 
financial crisis.133 In other words, banks would continue to take excessive risks as they are 
expected to receive future bail-outs.134 This is addressed in several Cases such as in Real 
Estate Hypo in which the Commission notes that burden sharing is for the purpose of limiting 
distortions of competition and avoiding moral hazard.135 In the Case of Sachsen LB, it says 
that the fact that the old management and owners of the bank are not involved in the bank’s 
activities is a good sign against moral hazard.136  However, others noted that it is very 
unlikely that State aid will lead to moral hazard, as the impact of the crisis has been 
destructive for all banks.137  
The Commission was also concerned about aid sustaining market power. However, it is very 
difficult to analyze market power concerns in the case of State aid in the financial sector. This 
is because a traditional analysis under Article 102 TFEU has an additional complication, due 
to the fact that the assessment involves a comparison between the level of competition with 
the bank receiving aid and the situation in which the bank would exit the market.138     
When companies in difficulty were granted restructuring aid, they were usually required to 
take compensatory measures to compensate for the negative effects on competition. This 
has also been the case in the decisions in the financial sector.139 These measures included 
balance sheet reductions and behavioral constraints, divestment of core assets and 
divestment of non-core assets.140 These compensatory measures will be discussed in more 
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detail in the next chapter.  
4.5 Summary of the advantages and disadvantages of Rescue and 
Restructuring aid 
In summary, State aid might lead to significant distortions of competition in the market and 
moral hazard. These consequences can be limited through compensatory measures. On the 
other hand, in some circumstances, State aid might be used to preserve and maintain 
financial stability in a certain sector and the economy as a whole. It can also serve as a 
means to protect the competitive structure of the market and even increase competition.  
 
State aid might also be used for the protection of employment. During the financial crisis, the 
Commission assessed whether the positive consequences stemming from the aid, would 
outweigh the negative impact that the aid might have, in particular on competition. 
4.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the economic advantages of State aid in the financial sector are the 
preservation of the integrity of the internal market, ensuring financial stability, avoiding a total 
collapse of the financial system, decreasing the chance of a continuation and deepening of 
the financial crisis and protecting the national economy as a whole. The Commission also 
used State aid measures with the aim of protecting a competitive market and to increase 
competition in the market. A social advantage is the protection of employment.  
Negative consequences of State aid in the financial sector are possible distortions of 
competition and moral hazard. Compensatory measures were used to limit possible 
distortions of competition and moral hazard.   
It is interesting to see that in the Cases decided under the Crisis Framework, the social and 
economic benefits of the aid measures are increasingly seen in the protection of a 
competitive market and an increase in competition. This is especially the case under the 
Financial Restructuring Communication. There is limited reference to the objective of 
protection of employment in the Cases which were decided under the 2008 Banking 
Communication. However, I think the protection of a competitive market could imply other 
social and economic benefits such as the protection of employment. 
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5 Balancing between long term and short term effects of State aid
  
When the Commission decided on the approval of State aid measures and compensatory 
measures, the long-term impact and the short-term impact of the aid were taken into account 
by the Commission. It is interesting to see how the Commission balanced the short-term 
impact against the long-term impact of the State aid, as this had major consequences for the 
functioning of the financial sector during and after the financial crisis. The principle of long-
term viability plays an important role in the Commission´s balancing between short-term and 
long-term impact of aid. Long term viability is defined as ‘when a bank is able to cover all its 
costs including depreciation and financial charges and provide an appropriate return on 
equity, taking into account the risk profile of the bank’.141 Therefore the manner in which the 
Commission used this principle in its decisions will be analyzed below. 
5.1 Analysis of the legal framework 
5.1.1 The Rescue and Restructuring Communication 
The principle of restoring long-term viability is outlined in the Rescue and Restructuring 
Communication. The aid should not be used to keep firms artificially alive and in principle can 
only be granted once. This means that firms can only receive aid once every ten years, 
although there are exceptions to this rule.142  
5.1.2 The 2008 Banking Communication 
The 2008 Banking Communication was especially designed to combat the consequences of 
the financial crisis. Under this Communication, ad-hoc interventions such as structural 
emergency interventions, protection of rights of third parties and rescue measures that would 
go beyond 6 months, were allowed.143  
 
In its assessment of a restructuring plan, the long term impact of the State aid measures was 
taken into account. The restructuring plan required ensuring the restoration of long-term 
viability of the financial institution and an avoidance of undue distortions of competition.144    
5.1.3 The 2009 Impaired Assets Communication 
The Impaired Asset Guidelines had a strong focus on the long-term impact of asset relief 
measures. The long term-viability of the banking sector and the budgetary sustainability were 
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taken into consideration. 145   However, short-term considerations, such as safeguarding 
financial stability and underpinning bank lending were also mentioned as an objective of 
asset relief measures.146   
 
Apart from measures aimed at immediate effects this Communication also stressed the need 
to take long term considerations into account by implementing asset relief measures. 
Furthermore, like the other two Communications as described above, distortion of 
competition should be avoided when taking asset relief measures.147 
5.1.4 The 2009 Recapitalisation Communication 
The Recapitalisation Communication aimed at positive short-term as well as long-term 
impact of recapitalization measures. One of the short term objectives was to avoid possible 
insolvency. Additional capital injections were used as a means to limit the risks of banks 
becoming insolvent.  
 
Long term objectives were restoring financial stability and increasing inter-bank lending. In 
the longer-term, recapitalization should have led to a return to normal market conditions. 
Therefore the requirements of recapitalization measures should have ensured that banks 
would return to normal market conditions and a competitive and efficient banking system 
would emerge from the crisis.148        
5.1.5 The 2009 Restructuring Communication  
In the restructuring Communication, it is noted that once the crisis would be over, European 
banks should be in a strong global position based on a single European market.149 One could 
argue that hereby the Commission refers to a limitation and avoidance of the fragmentation 
of the internal market, which I think can be considered a long term impact.  
 
For the Commission to assess the long term viability of the bank, each Member State was 
under the obligation to provide a restructuring plan. This shows how the bank would restore 
long-term viability based on a restructuring plan. 150  The Commission noted that the 
restructuring period should be as short as possible. However, due to the special 
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circumstances of the crisis, time to complete the restructuring plan could be extended. In 
general the restructuring plan should be implemented within 5 years.151 
 
Furthermore, in the light of the crisis, the Commission made an exception to the rule that aid 
could only be granted, once every ten years. If justified by financial stability, aid could be 
granted more often during the restructuring period. 152 This was applied in the Cases of Bank 
of Ireland153, and the National bank of Greece.154  
 
It was stipulated that restructuring measures should not undermine the internal market. 
According to the 2009 Restructuring Communication State aid can be seen as a positive 
measure for keeping the internal market open, where the aid is conditional upon the bank to 
lending targets in other Member States.155 This can be seen as a long term impact of the 
restructuring of banks.      
 
As it is important to restore financial stability in the short term, it was important to fight moral 
hazard. The prevention of moral hazard could be seen as a short term impact of the aid 
granted under the restructuring guidelines. Moral hazard needed to be corrected to avoid 
risky behavior and to ensure a fast return to normal market conditions.156 Apart from a fast 
return to normal market condition, the prevention of moral hazard also has long-term effects, 
which will be explained in the next section.  
 
From the above, it can be concluded that the restructuring required under the Restructuring 
Communication is mainly aimed at restoring long term viability, but at the same time restoring 
financial stability in the short term through the avoidance of moral hazard. Therefore both 
long-term impact as well as short term impact of the aid measures, play a role in the 
Restructuring Communication.   
5.1.6 The 2013 Banking Communication 
Under the 2013 Banking Communication, financial stability is the main overarching objective. 
Financial stability can only be achieved when there is a healthy financial sector. ‘Capital 
raising plans should be assessed in close collaboration with the competent supervisory 
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authority with a view to ensuring that viability can be regained within a reasonable time frame 
and on a solid and lasting basis’.157   
 
The long term impact of aid measures are mentioned in the light of burden sharing. The 
Member States did not go beyond the minimum degree of burden sharing. As a result 
financial stability in the long-term could not be achieved. Furthermore, it was a threat to the 
integrity of the internal market as some Member States had stricter requirements than other 
Member States, which led to fragmentation of the internal market. Therefore, in the 2013 
Communication, it is mentioned that the minimum requirements for burden sharing should be 
raised. It is noted by the Commission that when these requirements are raised, there is less 
need for measures to limit distortions of competition. The raising of the minimum 
requirements can be considered as having long term impact as it aims at long term financial 
stability and protecting the integrity of the internal market.158     
 
Due to the changes in market conditions, the 2013 Banking Communication, favours in- 
depth assessment of a restructuring plan. This is in contrast to the 2008 Banking 
Communication, under which decisions were made solely on the basis of a preliminary 
assessment. These ad-hoc interventions contributed to the prevention of a collapse of the 
financial system. However, the restructuring efforts were often delayed and resulted in higher 
costs for the tax payers. 159 One could argue that due to the changing condition in the market 
by 2013 compared to the beginning of the crisis, there is a shift from short term impact to a 
more long term impact of the State aid measures.160   
5.1.7 Conclusion based on the legal framework 
Based on the legal framework long-term impacts of the aid were: restoring long-term viability 
of the company; restoring financial stability; a return to normal market conditions; limitations 
of undue distortions of competition; avoiding fragmentation of the internal market and 
avoiding moral hazard.   
 
Restoring trust in the financial sector and thereby decreasing the likelihood of a total collapse 
of the financial system and avoiding moral hazard are the main short-term objectives of State 
aid in the legal framework.  
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Apart from being a long-term objective, measures aimed at avoiding certain types of behavior 
which fall under moral hazard can be also be considered a short-term objective, as it aims at 
keeping banks away from risky behavior in the short-term such as risky actions aimed at 
short-term profits.  
 
I think the Commission established a good and effective legal Framework to improve the 
financial situation in the short-term. The 2008 Banking Communication allowed for ad-hoc 
emergency interventions which were not allowed under the Rescue and Restructuring 
Guidelines. In addition, without the possibility of aid being granted more than once every ten 
years, which became allowed under the Restructuring Communication, it would have been 
more difficult to achieve financial stability in the short-term.   
 
Assessing the Commission Communications throughout the crisis, it can be argued that the 
Commission paid special attention to the restoration of long term viability of the banks. I think 
the new legal framework provided a relatively good and detailed guidance in assessing the 
amount of State aid and appropriate measures to be taken to solve the problems in the long-
term. Restructuring and recapitalisation measures were taken with a long-term perspective. 
Even though the return to financial stability in the long term is an important goal, some short-
term objectives such as avoiding moral hazard and restoring trust in the financial sector are 
also included in the legal framework.  
 
By looking at the development of the objectives of the Crisis Framework, one could argue 
that at the beginning of the crisis there was slightly more focus on the short-term 
consequences of the aid, whereas by the end and after the crisis, notably in the 2013 
Banking Communication, there was more attention to the long-term objectives. This can 
possibly be explained by the evolution and severity of the crisis. When the crisis started in 
2008 there was more need to intervene with short term objectives as it was important to 
avoid a complete collapse of the financial system.  
 
As the situation gradually stabilized and when the effects of the aid became clear, it became 
more important to look at the long-term objectives. However, from my point of view the 
avoidance of moral hazard remained one of the short-term objectives during the crisis. 
Companies had to be corrected from moral hazard as it avoided them from engaging in risky 
behaviour which would lead to more financial stability in the short-term and a faster return to 
‘healthy’ market conditions in the short run.  
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In my opinion, although it was important to solve the problems in the short-term, the 
Commission should have been more aware of and should have focused more on the long-
term consequences when developing its legal framework at the beginning of the crisis. The 
Commission should have been stricter with their assessment of restructuring plans, by 
including an in-depth assessment of the companies’ restructuring plan in its legal framework 
starting with the 2008 Banking Communication. It could be expected that without an in-depth 
assessment, restructuring plans would be delayed. In addition, I would like to argue that it 
could be expected that Member States would not go beyond the minimum requirements of 
burden sharing, which did not result in financial stability in the long-term.  
 
However, I think that the Commission learned from the crisis and improved its legal 
framework by focusing more on the long-term objectives, in particular with the introduction of 
the 2013 Banking Communication and the 2009 Restructuring Communication under which 
the Commission took a more in-depth assessment of restructuring obligations. With a more 
in-depth investigation it will be more likely that the restructuring is completed within the 
required time-frame with a higher chance of restoring long-term financial stability.  
5.2 Analysis of the Case law 
In the analysis of the Case law I will look at which long-term and short-term consequences 
were taken into account and whether long-term or short-term consequences prevailed. I have 
chosen the Cases based on their importance in terms of the amount of State aid granted and 
the time period in which they were decided, so as to cover decision under the entire legal 
framework developed by the Commission.  
5.2.1 Measures aimed at restoring long-term viability in the Case law  
The Commission accepted a number of measures aimed at ensuring long-term viability. 
Examples from the Case law are: 
 a reduction of financial institutions´ activities; 
 cost cutting measures; 
 change on management and Corporate Governance; 
 price leadership bans;  
 and sale of the financial institution.161 
5.2.2 Decision under Article 107 (3) (c) TFEU and the Rescue and Restructuring 
Communication: The Case of Sachsen LB 
One of the first State aid Cases which was decided under the Rescue and Restructuring 
Communication and under Article 107 (3) (c), during the financial crisis, was the Case of 
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Sachsen LB. Sachsen LB was acting as a central bank in Saxony (Germany), with a group 
balance sheet of 67,8 billion Euro and own capital of 880 million Euro. Sachsen LB was not 
able to refinance itself and was not able to provide liquidity of 17,1 billion Euro. In August 
2007 Sachsen LB was sold to LBBW, which is the Landesbank of the Federal State of 
Baden-Wurttemberg. The Free State of Saxony granted a guarantee of 2.75 billion, up to an 
amount of 8.75 billion Euro.162 
The Commission assessed whether the restructuring of Sachsen LB would restore the long 
term viability of Sachsen LB. The Commission mentioned that the sale of Sachsen LB would 
contribute to the long-term viability. With the sale to LBBW, Sachsen LB would be able to 
compete on its own merits.163  
 
Furthermore, the change in ownership structure would contribute to the restoration of long-
term viability. The previous ownership structure was considered to be one of the key 
problems of the financial problems of Sachsen LB.164 
 
The Commission pointed out that Sachsen LB would be able to compete on its own merits 
and that the reduction in activities as mentioned in the restructuring plan would be essential 
to avoid mistakes that happened in the past.165  
 
According to the Commission, ‘the restructuring will restore the long term viability of Sachsen 
LB’. 166  The Commission pointed out that Sachsen LB would be able to compete on its own 
merits and that the reduction in activities as mentioned in the restructuring plan will be 
essential to avoid mistakes that happened in the past. In addition, the divestments made 
would also contribute to the bank’s long-term viability as the bank had abandoned its loss 
making activities.167  
Based on the Commission’s decision in Sachsen LB it can be concluded that the long-term 
impact of the restructuring plan on the viability of the financial institution was important for the 
approval of the State aid measures.  
5.2.3 Decision under the 2008 Banking Communication and Article 107 (3) (b) TFEU: 
The Case of Fortis Bank and Fortis Bank Luxembourg 
A Case which involved a huge amount of State aid is the Fortis Case. This Case concerned 
measures taken in favour of Fortis Bank and Fortis Luxemburg, between the 29th of 
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September and the 5th of October by The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg.168  The 
measures consisted of capital injections, liquidity assistance and the sale of the Dutch 
operations of Fortis Bank.169 
 
In the restructuring Case of Fortis AB, the Commission analyzed whether the targeted aid 
would restore long term viability. This was assessed under the 2008 Banking 
Communication. 170 
 
The Commission considered whether the sale of part of the Dutch operations of the bank to 
BNP Paribas, which accounted for 40% of the size of the bank, helped to restore the long 
term viability of the financial institution.171  
 
Regarding long term viability, the Commission noted that ‘BNP Paribas had a positive rating, 
which reflected its financial soundness’172. Therefore it was expected that once Fortis Bank 
would become part of BNP Paribas, the problems of raising finance would be solved. Based 
on this, the Commission concluded that the measures taken met the criteria of restoring long-
term viability and were well targeted.173  
 
In its proportionality assessment, the Commission noted that the recapitalization measures 
were necessary to restore market and public confidence and to stop the bank run. This was 
an emergency measure with the aim of restoring market and public confidence in the short 
term.174  
 
Before the recapitalization took place, many customers withdrew, and interbank lending was 
impossible. As a result the liquidity situation of the bank was tragic. The purchase of FBN 
(Fortis Bank Nederland) by The Netherlands, improved the liquidity situation of Fortis Bank. 
Furthermore, there had been a lot of uncertainty about the value and financing of the 
acquisition of ABN AMRO. The purchase helped to improve the trust in the bank.175 It can be 
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argued that the improvement of the liquidity situation was one with an impact on the short 
term as this resulted in a rapid restoration of trust in the bank.    
 
In addition, compared to a scenario of nationalization, the Commission noted that the sale of 
BNP Paribas to a private actor made it possible to limit future aid.176 
 
The Fortis Case shows that, in the Commission’s assessment of the restructuring plan, both 
long-term and short-term consequences of the aid were taken into consideration. Hereby the 
emergency situation as to the bank’s liquidity problems was a crucial factor in approving the 
restructuring measures with a short-term impact. 
 
5.2.4 Decisions under the 2008 Banking Communication and Recapitalisation 
Communication and the Rescue and Restructuring Communication: The Cases of 
the Recapitalization of The Bank of Ireland and Commerzbank 
One Case which illustrates that the public intervention was aimed at restoring short term 
confidence and financial stability in the financial sector and the wider national economy, is 
the Bank of Ireland Case, which was decided in March 2009. The situation in Ireland was 
extraordinary as the Irish retail banking sector was extremely concentrated. Only two banks, 
the Bank of Ireland and the Allied Irish bank, had a market share of 65%.177    
 
The Bank of Ireland, was one of the two largest banks in Ireland, and had a balance sheet 
that had approximately 100% of the Irish GDP. The Irish authorities noted that the Bank of 
Ireland was of major importance for maintaining stability in the Irish financial sector.178   
 
The Commission stipulated that the loss of confidence in the Irish financial bank could have 
formed a serious risk for a crisis in the Irish financial sector, with negative consequences for 
the wider economy. The Commission pointed out that the public sector intervention in the 
form of a capital injection of 3,5 billion Euro, was important to restore market confidence in 
the Irish financial sector, in order to avoid the risk of a serious disturbance in the Irish 
economy. 179   
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The Commission also assessed the limitation of the aid to the strict necessary. This decision 
had been taken under the Recapitalisation Communication, in which it says that there should 
be sufficient incentives to stop the State participation, when market conditions allow. In this 
Case the Commission said that the level of remuneration which is further complemented by 
redemption clauses and the presence of Warrents provided for such incentive.180   
 
Another important Case that was decided under the 2008 Banking Communication and 
Recapitalization Communication was the Case of Commerzbank. This Case concerned the 
aid granted by the German government of 18 billion Euro in the form of new capital.181 In 
order for Commerzbank to receive the aid granted by the German government, several 
measures were undertaken. The Commission assessed these measures to see whether they 
were compatible with the requirements under Article 107 (3) (b).182  
 
The Case of Commerzbank was taken in a phase in which the Commission went back to the 
Rescue and Resctructuring Guidelines.183 In this Case the Commission explicitly mentioned 
the Rescue and Restructuring Communication and assessed the restructuring measures 
under the Rescue and Restructuring Communication. Hereby the Commission took the crisis 
situation in the financial markets into account. This was especially applicable to the rules for 
own contribution as set out in the Rescue and Restructuring Communication.184  
 
In the Case of Commerzbank, the Commission’s assessment of the plan in terms of restoring 
long-term viability, had been positive. Measures undertaken by Commerzbank with the aim 
of reducing its market presence included the transfer and selling of shareholdings and 
assets, the reduction of market presence by cutting the number of branches, divestments of 
risk-weighted assets, a cutback in costs and a reduction in the balance sheet. The focus on 
the core areas of the bank had already resulted in the growth of Commerzbank, even during 
the crisis.185      
 
Commerzbank’s liquidity was stable during the crisis and they had sufficient liquidity reserves 
to survive. Furthermore, the bank had learned from its mistakes by improving its corporate 
governance and changed its risk management strategy for a less vulnerable future. By 
ensuring to use the aid to supply the credit to the real economy, the bank also complied with 
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the objective under the Recapitalization Communication of ensuring lending to the 
economy.186 
 
From the above, it becomes clear that the restructuring plan was mainly assessed on long 
term impact such as lending to the real economy. However, the change in the governance of 
the bank can also be considered as having an impact on the functioning of the bank and its 
financial stability in the short term. 
5.2.5 Decision under the Impaired Asset Communication, the Restructuring 
Communication and 2008 Banking Communication: the Case of ING Bank 
The Case of ING Bank was decided under the Impaired Asset Communication and the 
Restructuring Communication.187 The ING Bank was one of the biggest financial institutions 
in the world.188 At the time the decision was taken, it had more than 70 individual businesses 
and operated in more than 50 countries. ING received a capital injection of 10 billion Euro 
from the Dutch State.189  
 
The Commission assessed ING’s restructuring plan. ING needed to restructure considerably 
as ING had received aid which exceeded 2% of the total bank’s risk-weighted assets 
(RWA).190 In its assessment the Commission looked at whether long-term viability would be 
restored, ING’s own contribution and the measures addressing distortions of competition.191     
 
The Commission noted that the restructuring plan showed that long term viability could be 
achieved, even in stress scenario’s with a continued global recession.192 ING would also 
improve its capital structure, which would decrease its exposure to higher risk asset classes. 
Furthermore ING did not aim at increasing its real estate exposure, had initiated a risk 
reduction policy and cost cutting programme and would adapt to the lessons learned from 
the crisis. One of the long term effects achieved through restructuring would be the 
generation of excess capital, which would strengthen the capital basis of ING. In the 
Commission’s view, this was sufficient to restore long term viability.193 
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The Commission addressed the concept of moral hazard in connection with burden sharing. 
An appropriate burden sharing would decrease the chance of moral hazard.194 Furthermore, 
to limit the aid to the minimum necessary, ING was not allowed  to do any acquisitions.195   
 
From the Commission’s assessment of ING’s restructuring plan it can be argued that in order 
to regain long-term viability and to have an appropriate own contribution to the restructuring 
costs, most of the measures were taken with a long term impact. 
5.2.5 Conclusion based on the Case law 
Based on the Cases as described above, it is possible to conclude that both short-term and 
long-term objectives of the aid were taken into consideration when approving the State aid 
and the conditions under which the aid was approved.  
 
State aid was approved as an emergency measure with the objective of restoring confidence 
in the financial market and avoiding the risk of a disturbance of the national economy as a 
whole, with possible negative spill-overs to the whole EU economy. In my opinion this can be 
seen as a short-term emergency objective, as it was a way to rescue the national economies 
of Member States and the EU as a whole from a total collapse of the financial system and a 
deepening of the financial crisis. Short-term consequences were one of the objectives of 
these emergency measures as these measures were specifically targeted at a fast return to 
financial stability.      
 
The Commission applied the compensatory measures as developed in the legal framework 
in the Case law. The avoidance of moral hazard played an important role in the design of 
compensatory measures and the approval of State aid in the Commission’s decisions. 
Limiting the aid to the minimum necessary and an appropriate own contribution (burden 
sharing) to the costs were the main means through which the Commission aimed at restoring 
financial stability in the long-term.  
 
From my point of view the avoidance of moral hazard in the Case law is both a long-term as 
well as a short-term objective. It is a short-term objective in the sense that if banks are aware 
of State aid granted to other banks, it might be more likely that banks take more risks as they 
expect to receive State aid as well. Avoiding moral hazard through compensatory measures 
can prevent banks from risky behaviour in the short-term. The assumption which might be 
created that certain banks are politically and economically too important to collapse, can also 
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have long-term impact as this might lead to continuous risky behaviour in the long term. In 
this sense the avoidance of moral hazard has a long-term objective.  
 
It is not possible to say that long-term impact prevailed over short-term impact, or the other 
way around. However, the Case law shows that when taking measures with a short term 
objective, the long term consequences were also taken into account. Furthermore, the Case 
law shows a gradual shift from short-term impact to long-term impact. According to my 
assessment, the reason might be found in the severity of the financial crisis and the 
increased expertise and experience in dealing with State aid Cases at a later stage during 
the financial crisis. Furthermore, the Commission could learn from its decisions that were 
taken at the beginning of the crisis in 2008, as some of the effects of these decisions were 
already visible.  
 
I think it has been important that the Commission approved aid based on the minimum 
amount necessary. In this manner it was more likely that financial stability would be restored 
in the long-term and risky behavior, which could fall under moral hazard, would be reduced 
or eliminated. If the Commission would not have granted State aid to the strict minimum, I 
would expect that banks might continue with their risky behavior because they know they 
would be granted State aid which would be beneficial for them.  
 
The measures applied to restore long-term viability in the banking sector could be 
successful. I think the change of corporate governance was a necessary measure, as this 
was often the cause of financial problems. The measures taken in the Case of 
Commerzbank which were aimed at long-term impact to reduce its activities and its market 
presence, already proved to be successful in the short-term so I would expect these 
measures to be positive in the long-term as well.  
5.3 Conclusion based on the legal framework and the Case Law 
There is a clear connection between the development of the balancing between short-term 
and long-term consequences between the Legal Framework and the Case Law. This flows 
from the application of the legal framework to the Case law.  
 
Moreover, both the legal framework and the Case law responded to the changing situation of 
the financial crisis, from a very severe situation in the financial sector at the beginning of the 
crisis in 2008 to one that became less harsh, by 2009. In the beginning of the financial crisis 
the legal Framework and the Case law focused more on short-term objectives, whereas at a 
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later stage during the crisis, the long-term objectives became more a focal point for the 
Commission. 
 
I think the Commission focused more on the short-term objectives in the beginning because 
it was crucial to return as quickly as possible to normal market circumstances, which could 
be done by focusing on the short-term. Nonetheless, the objective of avoiding moral hazard 
remained a short-term as well as a long-term objective throughout the crisis in the legal 
framework as well as in the Case law.  
The Commission responded well by developing and applying a new legal framework, based 
on Article 107 (3) (b) to solve the problems in the short-term, as under the new framework 
emergency ad-hoc interventions could be used to restore confidence in the financial 
institutions and thereby avoiding a collapse of the financial sector as a whole, which would 
have been more difficult under the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines and with Article 107 
(3) (c) as its legal basis.  
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6 Balancing between positive social effects and negative market 
oriented effects and how competition distortions were limited 
 
When the Commission decides on a State aid measure, the positive and negative effects 
deriving from the aid are balanced against each other. The manner in which the Commission 
balanced the positive and negative effects in the legal framework and the Case Law during 
the financial crisis will be outlined below.  
6.1 How the Commission is balancing the economic and social advantages 
against the market oriented disadvantages 
When the Commission decides on a State aid measure, the positive and negative effects 
deriving from the aid are balanced against each other. First the Commission makes an 
assessment on the contribution of the aid measures to the promotion of a public interest 
mentioned in Article 107 (3) TFEU. Secondly, the Commission examines whether the 
potential benefits of the aid outweigh the possible distortions of competition deriving from this 
aid. 196 
 
The balancing test can be summarized using the three conditions that need to be 
fulfilled:  
“1. The aid must be an appropriate means to attain an objective mentioned in 
Article 107 (3) TFEU. In other words, an aid measure must be “well targeted” to 
effectively achieve its public policy aim, and it must provide sufficient incentives 
for the aid recipient to change its behavior in order to attain the pursued public 
policy interest. Aid should not be used to subsidize the beneficiary’s “operating 
costs” and allow the beneficiary to simply continue its activities in the same 
manner as before the granting of the aid. 
2. The aid must be limited to the minimum amount necessary to effectively 
achieve its objective, and it must be the “least distortive” form of aid to attain 
this objective; and 
3. The aid must be proportionate, i.e. it must be designed so as to minimize 
negative spill-over effects on competitors, other sectors and other Member 
States and thus to limit distortions of competition to the unavoidable 
minimum.”197  
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In balancing the positive and negative effects of State aid the Commission considers the 
short-term re-stabilization of the economy and the long term development of competition.198  
In order to minimize the negative effects on competition, the Commission developed market 
presence and reduction of entry barriers. Furthermore, the aid should be proportionate to the 
distortive effects, taking the size and selective importance of the firm in its market into 
account.199 
6.2 Assessment of the legal framework:  Balancing between economic and 
social advantages against the market oriented disadvantages and 
measures to minimize undue distortions of competition 
6.2.1 The Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines 
As mentioned earlier, the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines, allow for restructuring aid 
only if it can be justified by other social and economic benefits. Benefits flowing from the aid 
should outweigh the distortions of competition. Employment problems and the formation of a 
monopoly or a tight oligopoly situation are mentioned as possible negative social and 
economic effects. Compensatory measures in favor of competitors are necessary to prevent 
distortions of competition. These measures must be proportionate to the distortive effects.200 
Furthermore, the amount of aid and the form in which it is granted must not lead to 
aggressive, market-distorting activities as this can lead to distortions of competition.201 
6.2.2 The 2008 Banking Communication 
In the 2008 Banking Communication, which is now replaced by the 2013 Banking 
Communication, the measures aimed at limiting distortions of competition in the case of 
guarantee schemes were outlined. These measures included behavioral constraints such as 
restrictions on commercial conduct, limitations to the size of the balance sheet, a minimum 
private contribution to the costs of the restructuring and a limitation of the aid to the 
minimum. Additionally, it also contained provisions that enabled Member States to enforce 
behavioral constraints on the beneficiary.202   
Aid measures were assessed on the safeguard that there was no distortion of competition 
deriving from the aid. Hereby the Commission took experience from past State aid Cases 
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into account and distinguished between sound and unsound banks. Banks that needed 
restructuring as a result of their internal business model or investment strategy, raised more 
serious concerns, than banks that needed restructuring as a result of the financial crisis 
situation.203 
The above also applied to capital injections. To limit distortions of competition, the capital 
injections must be limited to the minimum necessary and should not lead to aggressive 
behavior of the financial institution.204     
6.2.3 The 2009 Recapitalization Communication 
The Recapitalization Communication sets out the possible competition concerns of 
recapitalization and the balancing between the economic benefits and the negative effects on 
competition. Recapitalizations could have the objectives of restoring financial stability, 
ensuring lending to the real economy and dealing with the systematic risk of possible 
insolvency.205  
These objectives were balanced against possible distortions on competition. Three different 
levels of distortions of competition were identified. Firstly, in the absence of an appropriate 
risk-based justification, access to capital at lower rates than competitors from other banks in 
other Member States, could confer a competitive advantage to the beneficiary of the aid in 
the internal market. Secondly, recapitalization schemes could give an undue advantage to 
distressed or less-performing banks, which could lead to distortions of competition. Thirdly, 
recapitalization should not put banks that do not have access to public funding in a less 
competitive position.206 
In its assessment of the recapitalization scheme the Commission balanced the objectives of 
restoring financial stability, ensuring lending to the real economy and dealing with the risk of 
insolvency with the possible distortions of competition as outlined above. In order to limit 
distortions of competition, the aid should be proportionate and temporary. Moreover, the form 
and amount should be in such a way as it encourages banks to stop being dependent on 
state interventions as soon as market conditions allow. This will allow a competitive and 
efficient banking structure to emerge from the crisis.207  
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In the balancing a distinction between well-performing (fundamentally sound) and less 
performing banks was made. As already mentioned in chapter 2, banks with a higher risk 
profile should pay more. Less performing banks were subject to stricter requirements than 
well-performing banks.208  
In relation to recapitalization schemes, the 2008 Banking Communication, said that 
safeguards against possible abuses and distortions of competition may be necessary. 
Capital injections should be kept to the minimum so the beneficiary would not be capable to 
get involved in destructive commercial behavior.209 
The Recapitalization Communication stressed the importance of preventing aggressive 
commercial growth by the recipient. In order not to favor institutions that received financial 
aid to the detriment of competitor, mergers and acquisitions should be based on a 
competitive tendering process. In determining the extent of the behavioral safeguards, a 
proportionality assessment was used, which took all relevant factors into account, notably the 
risk profile of the beneficiary.210  
6.2.4 The 2009 Restructuring Communication   
The Restructuring Communication outlined the different types of distortions of competition 
caused by restructuring measures. Firstly State aid can prolong past distortions of 
competition caused by unsustainable business practice and risk taking behavior. Without 
State aid, companies which have unsustainable business practice and take excessive risks, 
will eventually lose market share, which can possibly result in the exit of the market. 
Secondly, State aid may have a negative effect on the functioning of the internal market.  
This can be caused by a shift of an unfair share of the burden and structural adjustment and 
the possible accompanying social and economic problems to other Member States. 211    
Measures aimed at restoring financial stability in the short-term should not lead to a negative 
impact on competition in the long term. Therefore, when State aid is granted, it is essential to 
take measures aimed at limiting distortions of competition. Due to differences in financial 
resources between Member States, State aid may have an effect on the single market. 
Furthermore, State aid may have a negative impact on banks that are fundamentally sound, 
which will also have consequences for financial stability. Furthermore, as national 
interventions during the crisis had a focus on national markets, the single market could have 
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been fragmented. For the protection of European business and consumers it was important 
to assess the market presence of beneficiaries to ensure effective competition and to avoid 
entry barriers and obstacles for cross-border activities.212             
In the application of the measures limiting distortions of competition, several factors were 
taken into account, notably the size, scale and scope of the activities of the bank. Measures 
to limit distortions of competition could either be in respect of passive or assets. The nature 
and form of these measures was determined by the amount of the aid, and the conditions 
and circumstances under which the aid was given. Greater burden sharing and a higher own 
contribution would result in fewer negative effects deriving from moral hazard. The higher the 
own contribution and the greater the burden sharing the fewer behavioral measures were 
required. It also depended on the structure of the market in which the beneficiary was 
operating. Here the Commission looked at the relative size and the relative importance of the 
bank on the market. The need for behavioral commitments depended on the market 
presence of the bank after restructuring. Where the bank had a high market presence it was 
more likely that behavioral constraints in the form of divestments were needed than when the 
market presence was lower. 213      
Measures used to limit distortions of competition or increase competition could be in the form 
of divestments. Banks may also be required to limit expansion in certain business or 
geographical areas. In addition, banks should not be engaged in anti-competitive behavior 
such as using the State aid for the acquisition of competing businesses. Another general 
means to limit distortions of competition was through adequate remuneration.214  
6.2.5 The 2013 Banking Communication 
The 2013 Banking Communication stresses the importance of burden sharing to limit 
competition between banks. The limitation of the aid to the minimum necessary and an 
appropriate own contribution, are two measures mentioned as contributing to a limitation in 
the distortions of competition.215  
According to the 2013 Banking Communication, the minimum requirements for burden 
sharing should be raised.  Under the previous Communications, some Member States limited 
themselves to the minimum requirements of State aid rules, whereas others have gone 
beyond the minimum requirements, which resulted in diverging approaches between the 
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Member States. Therefore, a higher degree of burden sharing will decrease the need for 
measures addressing distortions of competition.216  
In contrast to the previous Communications, a distinction is made between small and big 
banks. Aid to big banks is more likely to have effect on competition than aid granted to big 
banks. Therefore, small banks have a simpler procedure than big banks.217   
Attention is given to the methods to limit distortions of competition of liquidation aid. Firstly, 
the winding-up phase should be as short as possible for the orderly liquidation. Secondly, 
‘the operations must in principle be limited to continuing and completing activities pending for 
existing customers.’ In addition, ‘the pricing policy of the credit institution to be wound down 
must be designed to encourage customers to find more attractive alternatives’. 218 
6.2.6 Conclusion based on the Legal framework 
The legal framework provides for a balancing between economic and social benefits and 
negative economic effects. In particular, there needs to be a balance between the restoration 
of financial stability on one hand and possible undue distortions of competition and 
fragmentation of the internal market on the other hand.    
The legal framework shows the need to limit distortions of competition. The Commission 
developed several manners and used basic legal principles such as proportionality and 
burden sharing to maintain or in certain circumstance increase competition in the banking 
sector through State aid. One important means of limiting distortions of competition is 
keeping the aid to the minimum amount necessary and that it must be of temporary nature. 
The Recapitalisation and the Restructuring Communication in particular, provide for 
measures to limit distortions of competition.     
Throughout the legal framework the importance of burden sharing and a minimum own 
contribution are considered to be an important means of limiting distortions of competition. 
The principle of proportionality is used to assess the minimum burden sharing and the 
appropriate own contribution. In my opinion it is important that there is an appropriate own 
contribution by the banks as this will make it more likely that banks will use the aid granted 
effectively. It will also be more likely that the aid granted will not lead to a significant 
advantage to the receiver of the aid.  
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In the beginning of the crisis the Commission distinguished between sound and unsound 
banks in its measures to limit distortions of competition. Less-performing banks needed less 
restructuring than well-performing banks. In the first prolongation of the Restructuring 
Communication, the distinction between fundamentally sound and unsound banks was taken 
away. It can be argued that by abandoning this distinction, the Commission became stricter 
on the requirements for restructuring by requiring more restructuring for fundamentally sound 
banks.    
I think the Commission established a good legal framework addressing the need to limit 
distortions of competition while at the same time pursuing its public policy interest. By using 
the principles of proportionality, keeping the aid to the minimum amount necessary and of 
temporary nature and by putting restrictions on the banks’ behavior the risk of State aid 
measures having distortive effects on competition were reduced. I also think it was good that 
the behavioural measures depended on the relative market size and relative importance of 
the bank. In this way the Commission treated the banks in a fair manner and also limited 
possible distortions of competition.  
6.3 Analysis of the Case Law    
6.3.1 Decisions in the pre-crisis phase under the Rescue and Restructuring 
Communication and Article 107 3 (c) TFEU: the Cases of Northern Rock and 
Sachsen LB 
Northern Rock is an interesting Case as this was one of the first banks affected by the 
European crisis.219  Northern Rock was the fifth biggest UK mortgage bank. Its primary 
activity was mortgage lending, which represented 90% of all outstanding loans to customers. 
In 2007 Northern Rock got into trouble due to its dependence on wholesale funding as the 
market securitization market collapsed.220  It had severe liquidity problems. Therefore, the 
Bank of England gave emergency liquidity assistance to the bank. Due to the bank run after 
the news about the news came out that the Bank of England had provided emergency 
liquidity assistance, Northern Rock’s difficulties intensified even more. Therefore the Bank of 
England announced guarantee arrangements for all existing accounts on the 17th of 
September. On the 9th of October, the guarantee was extended to cover all new retail 
deposits.221   
The Commission noted that the aid could be justified on the grounds of avoiding serious 
social difficulties, as the liquidation of the bank would have led to unemployment. 
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Furthermore, as Northern Rock would not have been in the position to behave aggressively 
on the market, any negative spill-over effects would were avoided.222 
In the Rescue and Restructuring Communication it said that the aid, the amount of and form 
of the aid should not lead to aggressive and market-distorting activities.223 In the Case of 
Northern Rock, this condition had been fulfilled, by granting Northern Rock only the cash 
needed, one week ahead. This made it impossible for the bank to behave aggressively on 
the market.224 
 
As noted earlier, in the Case of Sachsen LB the aid measures were justified on grounds of 
serious social difficulties, as without the measure, Sachsen LB would have been liquidated 
and this would have resulted in unemployment. Furthermore, the measure did not lead to 
undue distortions of competition and did not have any negative spill over effects to other 
Member States.225  
The Commission also assessed the compensatory measures taken by Sachsen LB to limit 
undue distortions of competition. The commission pointed out that the compensatory 
measures, such as a reduction in LB’s financial market activities, in particular the major 
divestments made Sachsen LB which accounted for more than 25% of their profits in 2008, 
were proportionate in comparison to the distortive effects created by the survival of Sachsen 
LB.226  
6.3.2 Decision under the 2008 Banking Communication and Article 107 (3) (b) TFEU: 
The Case of Fortis Bank and Fortis Bank Luxembourg 
A Case which involved a huge amount of State aid was the Fortis Case. This Case 
concerned measures taken in favor of Fortis Bank and Fortis Luxemburg, between the 29th of 
September and the 5th of October by The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg.227  The 
measures consisted of capital injections, liquidity assistance and the sale of the Dutch 
operations of Fortis Bank.228 
 
In the Fortis Case the Commission assessed the effects on competition. The Commission 
noted that the rescue aid to Fortis bank would cause significant distortions of competition. 
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However, the position of Fortis Bank changed after the measures were taken. In particular, 
the sale of the Dutch operations, significantly reduced the size of Fortis bank, which made it 
possible to limit the distortions of competition which would have been caused by the aid. 
Hereby the significant reduction in market presence and a decrease in the risky behavior of 
the bank were stressed. The bank had taken greater risks than most other banks did which 
caused the major problems.229  
 
One of the behavioral constraints was the ban on acquiring assets bought by The 
Netherlands which would recreate Fortis bank. Furthermore, the bank was sold to a 
competitor, which was seen as a compensation for the possible undue distortions of 
competition.230   
 
In addition, moral hazard would most likely be prevented as the former shareholders of Fortis 
Bank and the management which took the decisions leading to the financial difficulties were 
not involved anymore. This would also limit distortions of competition.231  
 
6.3.3 Decisions under the 2008 Banking Communication and Recapitalisation 
Communication and the Rescue and Restructuring Communication: The Cases of 
the Recapitalization of The Bank of Ireland and Commerzbank 
In the recapitalization of the Bank of Ireland by the Irish state, which was decided under the 
Recapitalization Guidelines, the Commission did not make a detailed assessment on how the 
capital injection would lead to a distortion in competition, but saw the terms and conditions 
imposed on the bank through the Guarantee Scheme as sufficient proof that the measure 
would not lead to a distortion in competition. The Commission mentioned the bank´s 
commitment to refrain from mass marketing and a dividend as positive commitments to avoid 
distortions of competition.232      
 
The Case of Commerzbank was decided in a phase in which the Commission went back to 
the Rescue and Resctructuring Guidelines. 233  In this Case the Commission explicitly 
mentioned the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines and assessed the restructuring 
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measures under the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines, taking the crisis situation in the 
financial markets into account.   
 
To avoid undue distortions of competition, Commerzbank had to take a number of measures, 
which included a ban on growth through acquisitions and the obligation not to offer more 
favorable terms to its competitors in its core business areas. Furthermore, Commerzbank 
had to reduce its balance sheet by 45%. Commerzbank also needed to sell Eurohypo which 
would result in a significant reduction of market share in Germany and the rest of Europe. 
The Commission stipulated that this would limit any distortions of competition. 234 
Commerzbank was given a divestment period of five and a half years.235    
6.3.4 Decisions under the Impaired Asset Communication and the Restructuring 
Communication:  the Case of ING Bank 
A Case which has been decided under the Impaired Asset Communication and the 
Restructuring Communication is the ING Case.236 ING was considered to be one of the 
biggest financial institutions in the world.237 It had more than 70 individual businesses and 
operated in more than 50 countries.238 ING received a capital injection of 10 billion Euro from 
the Dutch State.239  
 
The Commission assessed ING’s restructuring plan. ING needed to restructure considerably 
as ING had received aid which exceeded 2% of the total bank’s RWA (Risk Weighted 
Assets).240 In its assessment the Commission looked at whether long-term viability would be 
restored as well as ING’s own contribution and measures which would address distortions of 
competition.241     
 
It is particularly interesting to see how the Commission assessed the restructuring plan with 
the aim of minimizing distortions of competition. As ING received a very large amount of aid, 
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ING needed to take significant measures in order to avoid possible undue distortions of 
competition.242   
 
Measures taken by ING included a reduction in the balance sheet of 45%. Furthermore, in 
ING’s restructuring plan it was stipulated that ING would carve out an entity243 in the Dutch 
retail market. The creation of this entity would increase competition in the Dutch retail 
banking market. Hereby it is important to note that in The Netherlands, the retail market was 
highly concentrated, with ING as one of the leading players, who would be able to maintain 
its high market share through State aid. The Commission’s assessment was based on ING’s 
commitments to ensure that the newly created business would be viable and that it could 
compete in the future. Considering the know-how and the human resources of the new entity, 
it would be capable to further develop its business. These measures ensured that 
competition in the Dutch retail market would increase.244 ING was required to divest within a 
period of four years. 245 
 
Furthermore, ING was prevented from acquiring attractive businesses. Moreover, ING and 
the Dutch authorities had opted for a price leadership ban in which ING would not offer more 
favorable prices than its best three competitors. In addition, The Netherlands committed that 
ING would refrain from mass marketing and also opted for a general price leadership ban.246 
 
The Commission finally concluded that all measures were proportional to the distortive 
effects on competition.247 
6.3.5 Decision decided under the 2008 Banking Communication and the 2009 
Restructuring Communication: The Case of United Kingdom Restructuring of 
Lloyds Banking Group  
Another Case which involved a divestment of an entity of a significant size, as part of the 
restructuring plan, was the Restructuring of Lloyds Banking Group (LBG). According to the 
Restructuring Plan, LBG would divest 600 branches in the UK retail market, which would 
represent a significant share of the UK PCA market and LBG’s share in the mortgage 
market. As the UK retail market was very concentrated the divested entity had the capability 
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to increase competition. Furthermore, the divested entity was important to address the 
competition concerns that were created by a merger between Lloyds TSB  and HBOS.248  
In addition, as regards competition geographically, the divested entity targeted the 
geographical markets in which LBG had the strongest position in terms of market shares.249 
Like ING, Loyds Banking Group had a divestment period of four years.250    
 
Other measures taken to limit possible distortions of competition were balance sheet 
reductions and a commitment to an acquisition ban. The Commission concluded that the 
measures were an appropriate means of addressing distortions of competition generated by 
the aid.251  
6.3.6 Conclusion based on the Case analysis  
The Cases show that in the beginning of the crisis when the decisions were taken under the 
Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines and under Article 107 (3) (b), the Commission referred 
to social objectives of the aid such as the need to protect employment. In contrast, in the 
Cases which were decided in a later phase under Article 107 (3) (c), the Commission 
focused more on the objectives of protection of financial stability and economic stability in the 
wider economy. I think the reason that the Commission did not focus much on social 
objectives, like unemployment, in a later phase during the crisis, was because returning to a 
financial and economic stable situation was considered as more important than the social 
objective of maintaining a certain employment level. However, I think the objectives of 
protection of financial stability and economic stability in the wider economy could also imply 
other social objectives. 
 
From the Cases as presented above it can be shown that the Commission applied the 
means to prevent undue distortions of competition as developed in the legal framework, in 
particular the measures from the Restructuring Communication.   
 
In all Cases the Commission took the relative amount of aid and its form into account when 
deciding about the appropriate measures to limit distortions of competition. In other words, 
the principle of proportionality is applied in addressing the problem of distortions of 
competition. I think it is important and necessary to do a proportionality assessment, when 
deciding about the amount of aid and the type of measures to be taken. Without a proper 
proportionality assessment it would be likely that the wrong amount of State aid would be 
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granted or the wrong type of measures taken, which could have significant distortions of 
competition.    
 
In highly concentrated markets, like the UK and The Netherlands, the creation of a new entity 
and divestments with the result of a reduction in market shares, were used as a means to 
increase competition and to avoid undue distortions of competition.  
 
Reductions in balance sheets and a ban on acquisitions during a certain amount of time, 
were frequently used measures to avoid distortions of competition. Furthermore, 
disincentives for aggressive commercial behavior such as the obligation to refrain from mass 
marketing were imposed on banks. In addition, the concern about moral hazard had been 
addressed through a change in management of the banks.  
 
An interesting development in the Case law was the degree of restructuring required. At the 
beginning of the crisis in 2008, a lesser degree of restructuring was required than at a later 
stage. With the introduction of the Restructuring Communication, the Commission became 
tougher with its structural measures and behavioral constraints.  
 
The increasingly tougher stance of the Commission towards restructuring can be seen in the 
Case law, as it shows that divestments are increasingly required in national as well as in 
other EU Member States. 252  This difference can clearly be seen by comparing the 
restructuring obligations between Fortis Bank and the Lloyds Banking Group. The latter had 
to comply with much further restructuring obligations than Fortis Bank.   
 
Likewise, the Commission became increasingly strict towards the divestment periods. In the 
Cases of ING and Loyds Banking Group the divestment period was four years compared to 
five and a half years for Commerzbank. 
 
The most significant difference in the approach of restructuring banks for the purpose of 
limiting distortions of competition was the removal of the distinction between fundamentally 
sound and unsound banks. This can be seen in the Case law by the increasing degree of 
restructuring required for all banks.  
 
From my point of view, for the creation of economic stability in the financial sector it was 
necessary that the Commission became stricter towards the requirements for restructuring 
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and the duration of divestment periods. Furthermore, I see the removal of the distinction 
between fundamentally sound and unsound banks as a positive step towards decreasing any 
possible distortions of competition and a more stable economic situation.  
6.4 Conclusion based on the Legal Framework and the Case law  
In conclusion, both the legal framework and the Case law stressed the importance of limiting 
distortions of competition. The compensatory measures, aimed at limiting distortions of 
competition, developed in the legal framework were applied in the Case law. Both show the 
development towards stricter and tougher requirements for restructuring during the financial 
crisis, with the aim of limiting distortions.   
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7 Evaluation of the effects on competition as a result of the State aid 
measures taken during the financial crisis 
 
I will evaluate the Commission´s State aid policy during the financial crisis using the extent to 
which the State aid caused distortions of competition as a criterion. I will describe the positive 
effects of the Commission´s approach. This is followed by an assessment of the effects on 
competition. Then I will make an assessment of the measures used to avoid distortions of 
competition giving a positive as well as a negative approach.  Finally, an overall assessment 
is made weighing the positive effects of the aid against the negative effects.     
7.1 Assessment of the EU State aid policy and legal framework on 
distortions of competition 
7.1.1 Avoiding a collapse of European financial institutions and restoring financial 
stability 
The European Commission noted that by the end of 2010 State aid measures avoided the 
collapse of the European financial institutions.253  The chance for a prolonged and deep 
economic recession was also reduced.254 Furthermore, State aid also contributed to restoring 
confidence in the financial sector. Between mid-2008 and the end of 2010, the State aid 
granted resulted in a normal functioning of the financial markets and restored financial 
stability. State aid also helped to preserve the single market.255 By 2010 there had been less 
recapitalization schemes and a decrease in ad hoc capital injections. This illustrates that 
most banks were not dependent on State support or could raise it in the market. This pointed 
towards an exit of State aid support by 2010.256  
 
On the other hand, by the end of 2010, the Commission decided to continue assessing State 
aid under Article 107 3 (b), for one more year. This demonstrates that there was still a 
serious disturbance of the economy. Furthermore, the sovereign debt crisis in Ireland, 
Greece and Portugal in 2010 and 2011 showed that the improvements in financial stability 
and the functioning of the financial markets were not everywhere and always endurable.257 
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Economic recovery remained very fragile and uneven across the EU.258 Negative comments 
also came from German officials, who accused the Commission of undermining the cohesion 
of the internal market.259  
 
Based on the above it can be argued that State aid to banks during the financial crisis was 
beneficial.260 However, as noted before, State aid did not proof to be an effective tool for 
equal and endurable recovery across Europe, as the economic recovery was very fragile and 
unequal in the EU.  
7.1.2 Avoiding distortions of competition 
When taking State aid measures, the Commission had to balance the objective of ensuring 
long-term financial stability with the objective of maintaining effective competition in the 
European banking sector in the medium- and long-term.261  
By the end of 2010, the Commission made an analysis of the market structure of the banking 
sector, with the aim of identifying any significant changes which would point at any distortions 
of competition as a result of the State aid granted during the financial crisis. The following 
indicators were used in their analysis: 
 size  
 concentration  
 consolidation  
 interdependence and  
 contestability at the top of the market.  
 
As will be explained below, these indicators did not show any significant changes in the 
structure of the banking sector compared to the period prior to the crisis.262   
By looking at the factor size, because of the financial crisis, the rapid expansion of the 
banking sector slowed down.263  
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In some Member States, State Aid resulted in a concentration of the market, whereas in 
other Member States, there was a de-concentration. This suggests that there is no 
correlation between State aid and changes in concentration of the market.264  
By looking at the factor of consolidation, there has been no difference in the consolidation 
trend during the crisis as compared to the period before the crisis. In the US many small- and 
medium-sized banks failed, whereas in the EU there were very few liquidation Cases of small 
banks. 265  
 
The crisis did not have much impact on the internal market ‘to the extent that banks do not 
seem to have retrenched behind national borders’.266  
 
By looking at the top 20 of banks in the EU, only 4 banks exited the top 20. The division by 
nation also remained quite steady. Despite the financial crisis, the banking sector remained 
relatively stable.267 
Based on the stability of the market structure of the banking sector as analyzed by the 
Commission, it is possible to conclude that State aid did not cause significant distortions of 
competition.  
However, according to the Commission ‘The stability of the structure of the European 
banking market and the key trends affecting the sector is only an indication that State aid did 
not provide an unduly advantage to aided banks that would have structurally altered 
competition on the market.’ 268  Therefore, the Commission also analyzed the relative 
performance of aided banks as compared to non-aided banks throughout the crisis. Aided 
banks decreased their profitability much more than non-aided banks. In terms of profitability, 
non-aided banks performed better than aided banks. On the other hand, the aided banks 
recovered much faster than non-aided banks.269    
In 2010 it was difficult to assess whether the Commission had been able to avoid distortions 
of competition. However, Member States had not been allowed to treat their own national 
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banks differently from other banks. Furthermore the amount of aid was limited. They also had 
to restructure which resulted in the sale of beneficiaries or their exit.270  
 
The most effective way in which the Commission minimized the risks of distortions of 
competition was by means of requiring restructuring obligations. In case of big amounts of 
aid received, the banks had to provide a detailed restructuring plan. Furthermore, measures 
with the aim of restoring long-term viability and burden sharing also contributed to limiting 
distortions of competition. Burden sharing helped to limit distortions of competition, as banks 
would be less likely to engage in risky behavior and to compete on incentives that derive 
from moral hazard.271  
According to the Commission, structural measures such as divestments of stand-alone viable 
business or carve outs of business entities potentially able of entering as a new market 
player are considered to be the best manner to address competition concerns. Examples 
from the Case law are the sale of Fortis Bank to BNP Paribas which had the potential of 
limiting distortions of competition272; the divesture of Europhypo by Commerzbank and the 
carve out of the SME; and the sale of mid-corporate banking business in the UK which 
created a new entity which would be a competitor in the SME and mid-corporate banking 
business in the UK273.274  
Furthermore, behavioral measures have helped to reduce moral hazard, which also 
contributes to limit distortions of competition.275 Competition distortions were also limited due 
to the proportionality requirement. The measures taken had to be proportionate to the 
objectives pursued.276  
The CEPS Task Force Report notes that all financial players and actors benefited from the 
measures taken to stabilize the financial sector. However, some financial institutions or 
sectors would have needed more support. National support schemes that supported the 
entire banking system in a specific country had been more successful in avoiding a decrease 
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in competition, than states providing support to individual banks. The French banking 
scheme was assessed as non-discriminatory as it was imposed on all large banks.277   
7.1.3 Negative stance on the Commission’s approach   
The Commission’s decisions and the legal framework which was developed by the 
Commission, to deal with the financial crisis through State aid, was not without criticism. It 
was criticized by academics as well as governmental officials278.  
‘The choice of remedy does not seem to be affected by the specific circumstance of the 
case; nor does the magnitude of the remedy seem to be correlated with factors which are 
likely to affect the extent of competition distortions’.279  In its choice of remedies to limit 
distortions of competition, the Commission focused on a reduction in the market presence of 
the beneficiary. Many of these remedies reflect the companies’ business plans. The 
company might have planned to divest that part of the business already. In addition the 
Commission had not shown in its decisions, the main factors which provide an understanding 
of the remedy on social welfare.280  
According to Ahlborn and Piccinin the Commission’s assessment and its policy of imposing 
‘compensatory measures’ had not been so beneficial. The main cause of this can be 
ascribed to a general aid and restructuring aid policy aimed at a reduction in market 
presence of the aided company through capacity reductions and divestments. These 
measures were not suitable to deal with the problems during the financial crisis and 
contributed to the worsening of the bad economic situation.281 
Other scholars note that structural measures, such as forced divestments or reduction in 
business fields and limits to expansion, which are often required by the Commission, have a 
significant effect on the market structure and significantly restricts the favored undertaking in 
its behavior. Consequently, the market is to some extent driven by public authorities. These 
measures should remain an exception.282  
 
                                                          
277
 Karen Lanno and Chris Napoli, Bank State Aid in the Financial Crisis: Fragmentation or Level Playing Field? (A CEPS Task 
Force Report, October 2010) Centre for European Policy Studies, 20-23 
278
 Particularly by the German officials, see Weber Hits out at Brussels, Financial Times, April 22, 2009.  
279
 Christian Ahlborn and Daniel Piccinin, ‘The Great Recession and other mishaps: the Commission’s policy of restructuring aid 
in a time of crisis’ in Erika Szyszczak (ed) Research Handbook on European State Aid Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
2011) 167 
280
 Christian Ahlborn and Daniel Piccinin, ‘The Great Recession and other mishaps: the Commission’s policy of restructuring aid 
in a time of crisis’ in Erika Szyszczak (ed) Research Handbook on European State Aid Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
2011) 165-167 
281
 Christian Ahlborn and Daniel Piccinin, ‘The Great Recession and other mishaps: the Commission’s policy of restructuring aid 
in a time of crisis’ in Erika Szyszczak (ed) Research Handbook on European State Aid Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
2011) 167 
282
 Daniel Zimmer & Martin Blaschczok , ‘The role of competition in European state aid control during the financial market crisis’  
(2011) 32 European Competition Law Review  9, 5 
61 
 
A similar negative stance towards the restructuring measures also came from the CEPS 
Task Force Report, by pointing out that there is a danger that the Commission will have too 
much influence on the structure of the market.283 They noted that ‘it is surely unprecedented 
for the Commission to take responsibility for dictating the ‘business model’ of private 
enterprise in the EU, even in the name of ensuring fair competition.’284 The Commission 
justified its approach by avoiding moral hazard and to guarantee long term viability of the 
bank.285    
In addition, according to some scholars, the Commission should only use rescue and use 
restructuring aid control to restore balanced competition instead of controlling moral hazard. 
According to them the Commission does not have the expertise to decide on measures 
which will limit future moral hazard.286   
One way to increase the protection of competition is by means of developing a framework for 
harm to competition. Furthermore, the Commission needs to design its remedies imposed to 
address the harm to competition. According to some critics moral hazard needs to be 
addressed with different remedies than competition concerns.287  
 
7.1.4 Overall assessment: Balancing the positive and negative effects of the 
Commission’s State aid policy aimed at limiting distortions of competition 
Balancing the positive and negative effects of the Commission’s Crisis Framework, I think the 
prevention of a total collapse of the financial system and the reduction of a chance for a deep 
and prolonged economic recession were the most important achievements of the 
Commission’s legal framework developed during the financial crisis. In addition, it is positive 
that the Commission’s approach resulted in no significant distortions of competition.  
The Commission’s decisions to limit distortion of competition had a major impact on the 
structure of the market. However, I think that in these circumstances, it is difficult to avoid 
making decisions which have an impact on the structure of the market. Furthermore, I agree 
too much government influence on the behavior of private companies and the market 
structure is not a good result of the legal framework developed by the Commission, but in my 
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opinion maintaining a financial system, restoring and maintaining confidence in the financial 
system and maintaining a certain level of competition is more important.  
Ideally the Commission should not use State aid rules aimed at limiting distortions of 
competition to combat moral hazard. However, moral hazard was one of the causes of the 
financial crisis, which made it necessary to fight moral hazard to prevent a further deepening 
and duration of the financial crisis. In the future the Commission can consider developing 
different remedies to fight moral hazard than for addressing competition concerns.  
Even though some decisions to limit distortions of competition were taken with the 
companies’ business plans in mind, they still helped to limit distortions of competition. 
Therefore, I do not regard this as a negative aspect of the Commission’s policy on State aid.       
Overall, the Commission’s impact on the prevention of a total collapse of the financial system 
and the prevention of a longer and deeper economic crisis should not be underestimated. 
Therefore, balancing the positive and negative effects of the Commission’s State aid policy 
and its developed legal framework, the positive effects on the economy as a whole and the 
limited consequences on competition outweigh the negative effects.  
7.2 Conclusion 
In conclusion, State aid to banks during the financial crisis was beneficial because State aid 
helped to restore financial stability in some Member States. However, State aid did not proof 
to be an effective tool for equal and endurable recovery across Europe, as the economic 
recovery was very fragile and unequal in the EU. 
 
By using effective tools to limit distortions of competition, State aid was also successful in 
maintaining competition between the banks. Based on the Commission’s analysis of the 
market structure of the banking sector, there were no significant distortions of competition as 
a consequence of the State aid. From the Commission’s assessment comparing the 
performance between aided and non-aided banks it can be concluded that State aid did not 
give a significant advantage to the aided banks because their relative performance was not 
better than that of non-aided banks. The fact that aided banks recovered much faster than 
non-aided banks, points at an advantage for the aided banks. However, I think that balancing 
the speed of recovery with the stability of the market structure and the relative performance 
of aided versus non-aided banks, the positive effects of the aid still outweighs the negative 
effect it might have had on competition.     
I agree with the Commission that structural measures leading to new entities entering the 
market and smaller entities remaining, is a good way to address competition concerns 
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because by having more players in the market it would be less likely that competition would 
be distorted. In line with Ahlborn and Piccinin, I would like to argue that the Commission’s 
choice of divestments as a compensatory measure might be influenced by the companies’ 
business plans, and could therefore not be considered as targeting factors which are likely to 
affect the extent of competition distortions. However, these measures were a tool to limit 
distortions of competition and I think it’s not wrong to use tools which reflect the companies’ 
business plan as long as they are successful in maintaining competition in the market.  
As mentioned in the CEPS Task Force Resport structural measures have a significant impact 
on the market structure. Therefore, in line with Daniel Zimmer & Martin Blaschczok, I would 
like to suggest that these measures can only be used in exceptional circumstances. 
However, as mentioned by the Commission, these structural measures are considered to be 
the best manner to address competition concerns. Therefore, they should still be applied, but 
only in exceptional circumstances.   
In conclusion, State aid was successful in maintaining and restoring confidence in the 
financial sector and thereby avoiding a collapse of this sector. Balancing the positive 
consequences of State aid on the stability and confidence in the financial sector with the 
negative consequences on the market structure and to a lesser extent on competition, I 
would like to conclude that the positive effects of the State aid outweighed the negative 
effects on the market structure. 
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8 Possible solutions to handling similar problems which occurred 
during the financial crisis: the formation of a European Banking 
Union 
 
In response to the financial crisis, there have been several solutions to handle similar 
problems in the future, in particular the formation of a European Banking Union. Its structure 
and the process and challenges leading to its establishment are explained below.     
8.1 The need for a supranational regulatory body at EU level 
In Europe, banking activities are, to a very large extent, cross border. On average, the 30 largest 
European banks conduct half of their business abroad. Despite the increase of cross border 
banking activities, no supranational regulators were created. In The de Larosière Report, 
which analyzed the causes of the financial crisis, the lack of supranational regulators were 
mentioned as one of the causes of the crisis. As the financial crisis was mainly spread 
through banks with cross-border activities, supranational regulators would have been better 
prepared to deal with the financial crisis than national regulators. The manner in which banks 
were regulated and supervised were part of the cause of the financial crisis, in particular, the 
fragmented financial regulation and supervision, which protected domestic markets.288 
The need for supranational governance has become especially important during times of 
crisis. In order to handle cross-border externalities, it is important to create supranational 
governance arrangements. 289 Due to the lack of supranational regulation , EU authorities did 
not have the capability to establish a coordinated response to the crisis. This is because the 
banking and financial sector remained regulated on a national level.290 The crisis showed that 
the EU was lacking a clear and predictable legal framework to deal with distressed financial 
institutions.291 
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 As a result, in the De Larosière Report it was suggested to form a European Systematic 
Risk Council (ESRC) and a European System of financial supervisors composed of three 
European supervisory authorities:  
 a European Banking Authority; 
 a European Securities and Markets Authority;  
 a European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority.292 
 
´An enhanced supervision framework would contribute to minimize the likelihood of a crisis in 
the future, while the new bank regulation would contribute to minimizing the cost of such a 
crisis by more appropriately sharing its cost between the public and private sectors, thereby 
also addressing moral hazard issues.’293  
A European Banking Union could be a solution to avoid the problems, which occurred during 
the financial crisis in Europe. It can be argued, ‘A single market in banking asks for unified 
supervision and resolution’.294 The European Banking Union can also be a solution ‘to the 
discrepancy between the national focus of financial market supervision and the cross-border 
dimension of the banking industry’.295 
According to the IMF, solutions for finding a better balance between short-term (financial 
stability) and long-term objectives (competition policy), would be to designate ‘responsibility 
for competition policy in the financial sector to a stability oriented EU body’. Another 
suggestion would be to increase cooperation between the Commission’s DG competition and 
the financial stability authorities, by establishing a specific framework and coordination 
mechanism.296 
8.2 The first steps towards the creation of a Banking Union 
By the end of 2010 the Commission noted that for preventing a crisis to happen again and to 
deal with the challenges related to the financial crisis in the long term, State aid control is not 
sufficient. State aid control can be beneficial in the short term but there is a need to 
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implement new and improved rules for bank regulation, supervision and resolution to solve 
the long-term problems.297  
In the 2013 Banking Communication, the creation of a Banking Union was mentioned.298 A 
Banking Union is created when the banks are placed under the supervision of a European 
authority, where the responsibility would belong to a federal government.299 In June 2012, the 
Commission noted that deeper economic integration, through the creation of Banking Union, 
could be a way to exit the crisis.300  
The Commission had ‘legislative proposals to create a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
‘to prevent banking risks and cross-border contagion from emerging’ and for the ECB ‘to 
carry out supervision directly’ by ‘using national supervisors in regular supervisory tasks as 
much as possible.’301  
The European Council decided to explore a single supervisory mechanism with the ECB as a 
supervisor´. This means that the ECB would act as a supervisor and lender of last resort at 
the European level. The ECB would be the major institution in the supranational framework 
for supervision of large European banks.302   
Following the institutional and regulatory changes taken by the Union during the financial 
crisis, in order to improve the prevention of the banking crisis, the European Council had 
agreed to create a Banking Union, which would start with a Single Supervisory System 
(SSM) and a Single Resolution Mechanism for credit institutions. In addition, `Member States 
had agreed to set up a stability mechanism by which financial resources could be provided to 
members and their banks in case of need`.303  
8.3 Structure of the Banking Union 
In December 2012, the Commission published the communication ‘A Roadmap towards a 
Banking Union’. This communication contains legislative proposals for the setting up of 
a Single Supervisory Mechanism by: 
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 conferring specific supervisory tasks in relation to credit institutions on to the ECB and; 
 adaptations to the Regulation setting up the European Banking Authority (EBA).304  
 
The Van Rompuy paper called for an integrated EU financial framework that should consist 
of three pillars: ‘single European banking supervision, a common deposit insurance and 
resolution framework.’305 
 
The Banking Union had to be based on: 
 a single rule book; 
 a single framework on banking supervision;  
 a common deposit guarantee scheme;  
 a single framework for the managed resolution of banks and financial institutions; 
 and a common backstop for temporary financial support. 306  
 
In the establishment of the Banking Union, the European Commission focused on regulation 
and supervision, which meant the development of the Single Rule Book and the supervisory 
powers of the ECB.307  
The ECB would have an important role to play in terms of supervision of credit institutions. 
According to the Commission ‘it is critical that the EBA plays fully its role to build a common 
legal framework and supervisory culture across the whole Union’, by using the existing 
instruments and powers.308 Furthermore, in this new structure, there should be access to 
financial resources, in case of need. This also includes tax resources in the last instance.309  
Overall, this new structure would constitute a major shift of powers and further centralization 
of banking supervision and resolution powers from the national to the EU level.310 
8.3.1 The single rule book 
The Commission noted that the creation of the Banking Union must not have a negative 
impact on the unity and integrity of the single market. This has been done by the 
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establishment of a single rule book, which ‘provides a common foundation which allows a 
move to the Banking Union without any risk of fragmenting the single market’.311  
’The single rulebook is the foundation of the Banking Union. It consists of a set of 
legislative texts that all financial institutions (including approximately 8300 banks) 
in the EU must comply with. These rules, among other things, lay down capital 
requirements for banks, ensure better protection for depositors, and regulate the 
prevention and management of bank failures.’312  
In summary, a single rule book is ´a set of fully harmonized EU rules applied consistently 
across the Member States.’313 
8.3.2 Single supervision: Supervisory powers to the ECB  
The supervisory powers of the ECB are outlined in EU regulation No 1022/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council. According to this regulation, a single supervisory 
mechanism is the first stage in the formation of a European Banking Union.314    
As of November 2014, the largest banks are directly supervised by the European Central 
Bank. The remaining banks are still being supervised by the national supervisors. The ECB 
and the national supervisors will be working together, to check that banks comply with the 
EU banking rules as well as to find solutions to problems at an early stage.315  
As already noted in the “Roadmap towards a Banking Union, the EU regulation on 
supervisory powers of the ECB”, the functioning of the internal market for Financial services 
should not be hindered by the creation of the Banking Union. The European Supervisory 
Authority (European Banking Authority (EBA), should continue to work on the consistent 
application of the single rulebook in all Member States and to strengthen the concentration of 
supervisory practices in the EU.316  
 
Besides the single rule book, there is a need for a European supervisory handbook on the 
supervision of financial institutions, which identifies best practices across the Union, 
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regarding supervisory methodologies and processes to comply with international and Union 
principles.317   
8.3.3 Single resolution mechanism 
A Single Resolution Mechanism has been established aimed at securing that failing banks 
are settled in an orderly manner with minimal costs for taxpayers and to the real economy. 
This Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) will be applicable to  the banks which are  covered 
by the SSM. The failure of banks will be managed in an effective manner through a Single 
Resolution Board and a Single Resolution Fund, financed by the banking sector.318  
The Single Resolution Board (SRB), has been in operation as an independent EU Agency 
since January 2015. The SRM, plays a significant role in case a bank is risking failure or 
fails. Its main purpose is to establish an orderly resolution of failing banks, while minimizing 
the costs. The SRM is responsi  ble for the prepration of resolution plans in cooperation with 
the national resolution authorities of the Member States.319  
The Single Resolution Fund, which is a pool of money financed by the banking sector, needs 
to ensure that funding is available for a medium-term period, while a credit institution is being 
restructured. The SRB will be responsible for this Single Resolution Fund.320  
8.4 Challenges in the formation of a Banking Union 
The creation of these supranational bodies or governance arrangements is not without any 
problems. ‘National banks have national government paper on their balance sheet; and 
national governments provide the fiscal backstop for national banks. Lifting banking 
supervision and resolution to the European level would mitigate this bank-sovereign link. But 
the long-term rationale for European governance is the intensity of cross-border 
externalities’.321 In addition, the creation of a Banking Union can possibly lead to a separation 
in the EU internal market between participating and non-participating Member States.322  
Furthermore, the formation of a Banking Union is challenging, as ‘the level of governance in 
charge of addressing crises should be the same as that is in charge of preventing them’. In 
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other words, ‘only a comprehensive Banking Union can address the fragility of the Euro 
area.’323   
Prior to the establishment of the Banking Union, there were different preferences on its 
structure. The European institutions and other Member States, including France, were in 
favor of a supranational body with the power to wind-down or recapitalize ailing banks. In 
contrast, Germany preferred establishing a network of national authorities that would 
coordinate separately.324  
One way of explaining these differences in the preferences in banking supervision, is by 
looking at the degree of foreign ownership and domestic bank internationalization of a 
Member State. Countries with a low level of foreign ownership and high levels of 
internationalization of domestic banks prefer more banking supervision harmonization at the 
European level. In contrast, countries with a high foreign ownership and a low domestic bank 
internationalization prefer keeping more autonomy for their national financial institutions.325  
8.5 Other solutions 
Apart from the European Banking Union, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) was set up in 
2009, with the purpose of identifying potential threats to global Financial market stability. To 
accomplish this task, the FSB works together with the International Monetary Fund. 
International exchange between regulatory authorities is promoted.326 
8.6 Conclusion 
Based on the analysis of The de Larosière Report, which mentioned the manner in which 
banks were regulated protecting the domestic market and the lack of a supranational 
regulatory body as one of the causes of the financial crisis, I think that the EU would have 
responded much better to the crisis by having a supranational regulatory body in place prior 
to the financial crisis. This can be supported by the argument that the banking sector was 
regulated on a national level which meant that it was difficult for EU authorities to respond to 
the crisis in a coordinated manner. 
I agree with the Commission that there needs to be improved rules for bank regulation, 
supervision and resolution to solve the long-term problems. Even though the new legal 
framework provided a good and detailed guidance in assessing the restructuring and 
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recapitalisation measures to be taken by financial institutions with a long-term perspective, 
this was not enough to create long-term and equal recovery across the EU.  
Based on the foregoing, the creation of a Banking Union with a single supervisory and 
resolution mechanism could be a possible solution to handle similar problems in the future. 
Especially due to the relatively large proportion of cross border activities of banks, it is 
important to have a supranational body governing European Banking. With a supranational 
body in place, such as a European Banking Union, it will be possible to act in a coordinated 
manner in response to crises situations.  
Assessing the structure of the European Banking Union it can be concluded that this involves 
a major shift in power in regulating the financial sector from the Member States to a 
supranational body. Not all Member States were favoring a supranational institution. 
However, I think that having a supranational regulatory body with the necessary tools to 
solve the problems in the long-term is more important than maintaining regulatory power at 
the national level.    
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9 Conclusion 
Based on the previous chapters the question on how the Commission approached the 
question regarding the approval of State aid to banks during the financial crisis in Europe is 
answered. The question on how the Commission balanced the interests of economic, 
financial and social advantages with market oriented disadvantages will also be answered. 
The balancing between short-term and long-term consequences will be addressed as well. 
The question on to what extent State aid led to distortions of competition will also be looked 
at. Finally possible solutions for handling similar problems in the future and future lessons we 
can learn from this crisis will be presented.   
9.1 Commission response to the financial crisis: a new legal framework 
The Commission responded to the financial crisis by developing a new legal framework with 
Article 107 (3) (b) as its legal basis, consisting of the 2008 Banking Communication, the 2013 
Banking Communication, the Recapitalization Communication, the Impaired Assets 
Communication and the Restructuring Communication. The main aim of the 2008 and 2013 
Banking Communications was to restore financial stability while keeping distortions of 
competition to the minimum.   
9.2 Balance of the interests of economic and financial stability and social 
benefits in the EU with market oriented disadvantages 
State aid in the financial sector has economic and social advantages as well as market 
oriented disadvantages. The following economic advantages of State aid in the financial 
sector can be identified: the preservation of the integrity of the internal market; ensuring 
financial stability; avoiding a total collapse of the financial system; decreasing the chance of 
a continuation and deepening of the financial crisis and protecting the national economy as a 
whole. The Commission also used State aid measures with the aim of protecting a 
competitive market and to increase competition in the market. One of the social benefits of 
State aid is the protection of employment.  
Negative consequences of State aid in the financial sector are possible distortions of 
competition and moral hazard. Moral hazard can arise as a result of State aid because if 
companies know other companies receive aid they might think they will be granted State aid 
as well, and as a result might engage in risky behavior. The Commission used compensatory 
measures to limit possible distortions of competition and to avoid the creation of moral 
hazard.   
In its legal framework the Commission balanced between the restoration of financial stability 
and possible undue distortions of competition and fragmentation of the internal market.  With 
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the aim of limiting distortions of competition, the Commission kept the aid to the minimum 
amount necessary and of temporary nature. The principles of proportionality and burden 
sharing were used to maintain or increase competition in the banking sector. The principle of 
proportionality was also used to assess the minimum burden sharing and the appropriate 
own contribution. By putting restrictions on the banks’ behavior the risk of State aid 
measures having distortive effects on competition was reduced.  
In the beginning of the crisis the Commission distinguished between ‘sound’ and ‘unsound’ 
banks in its measures to limit distortions of competition. Less-performing banks needed less 
restructuring than well-performing banks. In the first prolongation of the Restructuring 
Communication, the distinction between fundamentally ‘sound’ and ‘unsound’ banks was 
taken away. It can be concluded that by abandoning this distinction, the Commission became 
stricter with their requirements for restructuring by requiring more restructuring for 
fundamentally ‘sound’ banks. 
With the Commission’s legal framework in place, I think the Commission was able to provide 
guidance on the measures necessary to limit distortions of competition while at the same 
time aiming for more financial stability.  
In the beginning of the crisis, when decisions were still taken under the Rescue and 
Restructuring Guidelines and under Article 107 (3) (b), State aid was used by the 
Commission for social objectives such as protection of employment.  In later Cases, which 
were decided under Article 107 (3) (c), the Commission justified State aid more often by 
economic objectives such as protection of financial stability and economic stability in the 
wider economy.  
In the State aid Cases the Commission used the principle of proportionality to address 
possible distortions of competition. By deciding about the appropriate measures to limit 
distortions of competition, the Commission looked at the relative amount of aid and its form.  
In highly concentrated markets, the Commission used the method of creating a new entity 
and divestments with the result of a reduction in market shares, as a means to increase 
competition and to avoid undue distortions of competition. 
 
Both the Legal Framework and the Case law stressed the importance of limiting distortions of 
competition. The compensatory measures, aimed at limiting distortions of competition, 
developed in the Legal Framework were applied in the Case Law. There was a development 
towards stricter and tougher requirements for restructuring during the financial crisis, aimed 
at limiting distortions of competition.  This can be demonstrated by the abandoning of the 
distinction between ‘sound’ and ‘unsound’ banks.  
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9.3 Balance between short-term and long-term consequences of State aid 
The Commission balanced the short-term and long-term consequences of State aid in its 
assessment and approval of State aid. Assessing the Commission’s legal framework the 
following long-term objectives can be identified: restoring long-term viability of the company, 
restoring financial stability, a return to normal market conditions, limitations of undue 
distortions of competition and avoiding fragmentation of the internal market and measures 
aimed at limiting moral hazard.  
 
The Commission also had a number of short-term objectives in its legal framework which 
were: restoring trust in the financial sector and thereby decreasing the likelihood of a total 
collapse of the financial system and avoiding moral hazard.  
 
It can be concluded that in its legal framework, the Commission paid special attention to the 
restoration of long term viability of the banks. I think the new legal framework provided a 
good and detailed guidance in assessing the amount of State aid and appropriate measures 
to be taken to solve the problems in the long-term. Restructuring and recapitalisation 
measures were taken with a long-term perspective. The avoidance of moral hazard, which is 
both a short-term as well as a long-term objective, was also included in the legal framework.  
 
I think the Commission established a legal framework which was suitable to solve the 
problems in the short-term by improving the short-term financial situation. The 2008 Banking 
Communication allowed for ad-hoc emergency interventions which were aimed at restoring 
financial stability in the short-term.  
 
In its legal framework, at the beginning of the crisis the Commission focused a bit more on 
the short-term consequences of the aid compared to the end of the crisis. This can possibly 
be explained by the evolution and severity of the crisis. When the crisis started in 2008 there 
was more need to intervene with short term objectives as it was important to avoid a 
complete collapse of the financial system. As the situation gradually stabilized and when the 
effects of the aid became clear, it became more important to look at the long-term objectives. 
The avoidance of moral hazard remained a short-term as well as a long-term objective during 
the crisis. In my opinion the correction of moral hazard is also a short-term objective because 
correcting companies from moral hazard decreases risky behaviour. This will lead to more 
financial stability in the short-term and a faster return to ‘healthy’ market conditions in the 
short run.  
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In my opinion, the Commission should have focused more on the long-term consequences 
when developing its legal framework at the beginning of the crisis. This could have been 
done by being stricter with their assessment of restructuring plans starting with the 2008 
Banking Communication. In addition, the Commission should have raised the minimum 
requirements for burden sharing from the beginning because it could be expected that the 
Member States would not go beyond minimum requirements for burden sharing.  
 
During and towards the end of the crisis, the Commission improved its legal framework by 
focusing more on the long-term objectives. A more in depth-investigation of the restructuring 
plans were included in the 2009 Restructuring Communication. In addition, with the first 
prolongation of the Restructuring Communication the removal of the distinction between 
‘sound’ and ‘unsound’ banks, a higher degree of restructuring was required by the ‘sound’ 
banks. This pointed towards stricter requirements for restructuring for all banks. A more in-
depth assessment will increase the chances of long-term financial stability. Furthermore, in 
the 2013 Banking Communication it was mentioned that the levels of burden sharing should 
be raised.  
 
In the Case law, both short-term and long-term objectives of the aid were taken into 
consideration when approving the State aid and the conditions under which the aid was 
approved. State aid was approved as an emergency measure with the short-term objective of 
restoring confidence in the financial market and avoiding the risk of a disturbance of the 
national economy, with possible negative spill-overs to the whole EU economy. Short-term 
consequences were one of the objectives of these emergency measures as these measures 
were specifically targeted at a fast return to financial stability.      
 
The Commission applied the compensatory measures as developed in the legal framework 
in the Case law. Limiting the aid to the minimum necessary and an appropriate own 
contribution (burden sharing) to the costs were the main means through which the 
Commission aimed at restoring financial stability in the long-term.  
 
The correction of moral hazard in the Case law is both a long-term as well as a short-term 
objective.  I would like to argue that avoiding moral hazard through compensatory measures 
can prevent banks from risky behaviour in the short-term. Without the correction of moral 
hazard the assumption might be created that certain banks are politically and economically 
too important to collapse. This can lead to banks engaging in risky behavior in the long-term. 
Therefore, I would like to suggest that the correction of moral hazard in the Case law was 
also a means to prevent risky behavior by the banks which would eventually lead to more 
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financial stability in the long-term. Measures aimed at correcting moral hazard can also have 
short-term objectives because banks might engage in risky behavior because if other banks 
receive State aid, they expect to receive State aid as well. By correcting moral hazard 
through compensatory measures banks are more likely not to engage in risky behavior.   
 
The Case law showed that when taking measures with a short term objective, long term 
consequences were also taken into account. The Case law also showed a gradual shift from 
focusing on the short-term impact to the long-term impact. The reason might be found in the 
severity of the financial crisis and the increased expertise and experience in dealing with 
State aid Cases during the financial crisis. Furthermore, the Commission could learn from its 
decisions that were taken at the beginning of the crisis in 2008, as some of the effects of 
these decisions were already visible.  
 
Both the legal framework and the Case law show a shift in focus from short-term objectives 
to long-term objectives. I think this can be explained by the fact that in the beginning it was 
more important to return to normal market conditions as soon as possible than financial 
stability in the long-term.   
 
In conclusion, in the beginning of the financial crisis the legal framework and the Case law 
focused more on short-term objectives, whereas at a later stage during the crisis, the long-
term objectives became more a focal point for the Commission. The objective of avoiding 
moral hazard remained a short-term as well as a long-term objective throughout the crisis in 
the legal framework and the Case law.  
9.4 Assessment of the effects of the EU State aid to the financial sector 
State aid was successful in maintaining and restoring confidence in the financial sector and 
thereby avoiding a collapse of this sector. By using effective tools to limit distortions of 
competition, State aid was also successful in maintaining competition between the banks. 
One effective way to maintain competition between banks was through structural measures 
resulting in more and smaller entities on the market. In this way there were fewer chances of 
distortions of competition.   
I share the concern that structural measures imposed by the Commission have an impact on 
the market structure. Therefore I think these measures should only be used in special 
circumstances. However, I think the Commission should not refrain from using these 
measures as they are an effective tool in limiting distortions of competition as a result of 
State aid.  
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On the other hand State aid did not lead to an even and endurable recovery everywhere in 
Europe. This is something that can be improved in any future decisions on State aid in crisis 
situations in Europe.     
State aid helped to restore confidence and stability in the financial sector. State aid also 
contributed to more financial stability in the EU as a whole.  To some degree State aid had 
an impact on the structure of the market. However, I think it is very difficult to avoid any 
impact on the market structure with any kind of governmental interference in the banking 
sector. I also think that by granting State aid there is always a chance of distortive effects on 
competition. However, with the Commission’s legal framework in place which includes 
compensatory measures, these distortions of competition are to a very large extent reduced. 
I also think that the Commission has learned from its experience during the crisis. This can 
be demonstrated by the fact that the Commission became more strict in its compensatory 
measures towards companies, which reduced the risk of significant distortions of competition 
on the banking sector in the future.   
Based on the Commission’s analysis on the effects of State aid on competition it is possible 
to conclude that there were no significant distortions. However, to a very limited extent State 
aid has some degree of distortive effects on competition, as aided banks had a shorter 
recovery period than non-aided banks. Moreover, there is a possibility that State aid had an 
effect on the market structure. Based on my analysis I would like to conclude that the positive 
effects of the State aid outweighed the negative effects.  
9.5 Possible solutions to treat similar problems in the future and lessons 
to be learned   
A couple of lessons were already learned during the financial crisis. As the financial crisis 
proceeded, measures for improvement were taken by the Commission. By abandoning the 
distinction between fundamentally ‘sound’ and ‘unsound’ banks the Commission became 
stricter on the requirements for restructuring by requiring more restructuring for 
fundamentally ‘sound’ banks.  
In the 2013 Banking Communication, it was mentioned that the previous Banking 
Communications did not lead to financial stability in the long term, as Member states did not 
go beyond the minimum requirements for burden sharing. Therefore under the 2013 Banking 
Communication it was necessary to raise the minimum requirements for burden sharing. This 
was one of the ways to preserve integrity in the single market, as the previous approach led 
to different approaches to burden-sharing between the Member States.  
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I think the new legal Framework provided a good and detailed guidance in assessing the 
restructuring and recapitalisation measures to be taken by financial institutions with a long-
term perspective. However, this was not enough to create long-term and equal recovery 
across the EU. Therefore, there needs to be improved rules for bank regulation supervision 
and resolution to solve the long-term problems. 
An important lesson which was learned from the financial crisis is that without a 
supranational body in place, it was difficult to solve the financial problems of the crisis, as 
banks were and still are increasingly operating cross-border. Due to a lack of a clear and 
predictable legal framework, the EU could not respond to the financial crisis problems in a 
coordinated manner. In addition, the financial sector remained regulated on national level, 
which made it difficult for the EU to respond on EU level.   
I think that the EU would have responded much better to the crisis if there would have been a 
supranational regulatory body in place at the time of the crisis. This can be supported by the 
analysis of the The de Larosière Report, in which the lack of a supranational body and the 
regulation of banks which protect domestic markets, was seen as factors causing the 
financial crisis.  
The creation of a Banking Union with a single supervisory and resolution mechanism could 
be a possible solution to handling similar problems in the future. Due to the relatively large 
proportion of cross border activities of banks, it is necessary to have a supranational body 
governing European Banking. With the European Banking Union, it will possibly be easier to 
act in a better and coordinated manner in response to any future crisis situations in the 
financial sector in Europe.  
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